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My dissertation examines how dual-earning couples navigate the retirement 
transition differently now that women’s and men’s work lives have become more similar. 
As the retirement transition has become more complex, understanding how and when 
people retire requires researchers and policymakers to be attuned to the family lives in 
which individuals are embedded.  The decision to retire is an individual choice but one's 
family circumstances, particularly one's spouse, can influence the process. Couples must 
often factor in spouses’ age, health, pension assets, and health insurance coverage, 
especially since the work lives of many women have become much more similar to men.  
Whereas men’s retirement decisions were seen to depend on their employment situation 
and women’s’ on their husband’s, women’s rising attachment to the labor force means 
their work lives should be increasingly important in understanding the retirement 
transition of couples.  
This dissertation fills a gap in retirement research by utilizing a life course 
perspective to systematically study change across cohorts in how marital partners manage 
the retirement transition amidst rapid structural changes in the economy. Analyses use 
multiple waves of data from the Health and Retirement Study, applying a variety of 
 
 
modeling techniques to investigate the way that couples move from employment to 
retirement.  Specifically, I focus on retirement expectations and timing, looking at 
whether dual earning couples influence and synchronize each other’s retirement and how 
this may change across cohorts.  
Results suggest that coordination between couples may be declining, as both 
husbands and wives influence their respective partners’ retirement expectations less in 
later cohorts. Analysis of the degree to which dual-earning couples synchronize their 
retirement expectations show that such couples expect to retire together when they both 
have the pension resources to do so.  Results from event history models further indicate 
that the retirement trajectories have changed for the leading baby boom cohort, as 
evidence implies they are delaying retirement longer than previous cohorts.  The findings 
provide mixed support for the notion that wives are influencing their husbands’ 
retirement timing more in later cohorts or that the influence of husbands on wives’ 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
With the population of the United States aging, the decision of when to retire has 
become increasingly salient.  What influences the decisions people make has fallen under 
increased scrutiny in recent years, as the size of the labor force has declined and 
individuals face the challenge of ensuring they have enough income to last throughout 
their ever-lengthening lives. The discussion of what factors lead people to retire or 
remain in the work force usually centers around the economic calculus of a single 
individual, even though the majority of workers nearing retirement in the United States 
are part of dual-earner households (Moen et al. 2006).  In order to better understand how 
individuals navigate this enormous life course transition, we need to be attuned to the 
family lives individuals are embedded in because they are likely to have large sway on 
labor force decisions.   
To inform our national debate, this dissertation examines the changing nature of 
retirement among dual-earning couples and the complex work and spousal issues they 
face.  The decision to retire has great implications for a declining labor force, but 
understanding how and when individuals retire has become more difficult as the timing 
of retirement has become more variable. Structural changes in the retirement benefits 
employers bestow on employees have altered retirement incentives. In addition, the 
gender revolution of the latter half of the twentieth century has led to women's rising 
attachment to the labor force and their accumulation of pension assets of their own (Choi 
2002; Cotter et al. 1997; England 2010). And with advances in longevity extending many 
lives into their 80s and 90s, couples must take great care in ensuring their retirement 





elderly constitute a growing share of the population, the need to understand the retirement 
process and how it affects the well-being of this age group has grown.  
Couples face many challenges on the path to retirement. Many questions arise in 
the planning process which are not easy for individuals to answer, especially when 
agreement between two parties must be reached. Questions about income, health, 
longevity, home values, lifestyle, and the economy are some of the many issues couples 
must handle. Couples who are nearing retirement often need to develop answers on 
matters for which they may only be able to provide an educated guess.  Knowing whether 
a couple has enough money to sustain them, for example, entails having an idea of how 
long each person will live.  Of course, the question of whether the couple has accrued 
enough savings depends on answers to other questions, such as what kind of lifestyle 
couples want in retirement.  Couples who want to pack their bags and move or travel 
frequently will need more resources than those who want to downsize or age in place.  
Whether or not a couple has enough savings also depends on if one or both partners 
possess a pension or expect to continue working part-time.  Additionally, couples also 
have to factor whether they will have adequate income and health benefits to handle any 
health issues that may arise.  The retirement expectations and plans individuals develop 
during their primary working years can only approximate when they will retire and what 
kinds of obligations they will face. As people age, unanticipated problems may arise that 
lead them to change their retirement plans. At the same time, retirement expectations do 
influence the timing of retirement and are worth studying because they reveal how people 





For many years now, policymakers and researchers have expressed concern that 
the baby boomers would face greater challenges during the retirement transition 
(Easterlin, Schaeffer, and Macunovich 1993; Gale 1997).  On the one hand, higher levels 
of education and good health provide reason to be optimistic about baby boomers. More 
education and better health should enable this group to work longer and earn more, 
giving them more time to save and prepare for retirement. Since more women of this 
cohort are active in the labor force, couples should be more likely to have two income 
and pension sources to draw on in retirement. Both men and women from the baby boom 
are more likely to work in white-collar occupations than their predecessors, making it 
easier for them to extend their careers into older ages if needed or desired (Gale 1997). 
And boomers who were able to consistently invest their savings in the stock market in the 
1980s and 1990s could take advantage of historic gains made in the U.S. and around the 
world.   
While the baby boom generation possesses some advantages over earlier cohorts 
as they enter the retirement transition, a number of developments provide reasons to 
worry about the ability of this cohort to maintain adequate living standards in old age. 
Members of this generation will most likely depend on their own savings much more than 
any employer-provided pension. These savings would also need to last longer, as the life 
expectancy of baby boomers is projected to be longer than previous cohorts (Gale 1997).  
While the increased labor force participation of women certainly has enhanced the living 
standards of many households, several problems have disproportionately afflicted 
members of the baby boom generation.  The competitive, global, and service-based 





as downsizing and outsourcing have made the labor market increasingly volatile and 
more workers are susceptible to economic shocks such as unemployment. Boomers have 
faced pressures at home as well as at work, with the divorce revolution leaving many 
divorced adults without the benefit of a spouse and in a precarious financial situation 
during their working years (Bouvier, Leon F. and De Vita 1991).  Many boomers have 
also fallen into "sandwich" roles where they simultaneously support children and parents.  
These economic challenges, alongside the changing position of women and men in the 
economic order, provide reason to believe that the retirement process will look different 
for baby boom couples. This dissertation seeks to empirically test whether the retirement 
choices of people within dual-earning married couples has changed across cohorts in 
response to economic and social transformation.  
The decision to retire is an individual choice, but one's family, particularly one's 
spouse, can influence the process.  The move to partial or complete retirement has great 
implications for household income, health insurance coverage, marital satisfaction, and 
personal happiness. Therefore, it is no surprise that prior research has found that the 
retirement of one spouse can influence the other partner (Johnson and Favreault 2001; 
Moen et al. 2006; O’Rand and Farkas 2002; Pienta and Hayward 2002; Pienta 2003; 
Shuey 2004). Indeed, many couples prefer to retire at the same time (Johnson 2004).  The 
coordination of joint retirement often proves to be unmanageable, however, as a number 
of forces can prevent married couples from retiring together.  
Over time, changes brought on by the gender revolution have increasingly shaped 
the lives of each new cohort of retirees. The work lives of women in the latter half of the 





significant investments in education and their work skills, allowing them to establish 
careers (Clarkberg and Moen 2001). Even among women who have not attained college 
or vocational credentials, opportunities have expanded greatly (Goldin 1990). 
Furthermore, wage stagnation among those lacking a college education and the 
downsizing of many male-dominated jobs in manufacturing has led to a decline in men's 
labor force participation and wages for large segments of the population.  As a result, 
families increasingly depend on two incomes in order to maintain their lifestyle, meaning 
many women have become important contributors to household income despite the 
persistent gender wage gap that often makes them secondary earners.  Long, well-
established work histories mean that many women bring their own market resources to 
the table.  For many couples, the question of when to retire must now factor in both 
spouses’ savings, Social Security eligibility, pension assets, health insurance coverage, 
and personal preferences.    
Essentially, we do not know how the interplay of market and spousal forces has 
changed over time and across cohorts.  My aim is to find out whether new challenges 
confronting married couples lead them to coordinate retirement decisions more together 
or apart than in the past. The premise behind this project is that the influence of one’s 
spouse has evolved in the face of economic transformation, albeit in different ways for 
husbands and wives, leading to more divergent paths within couples.  
Using the life course perspective as a broad framework, there are many crucial 
questions about retirement that I address: How have couple retirement dynamics changed 
across cohorts? Do recent couples anticipate and transition into retirement in different 





to adjust retirement timing in response to their personal economic lives than their 
husbands’ work lives? How does the increased attachment to the labor force by women 
impact the retirement trajectory of their husbands as well as their own? By using the life 
course perspective, I can look at retirement against the backdrop of broader societal and 
institutional forces, as well as individual trajectories and family situations. 
As mentioned, I will concentrate my research on dual-earning married couples.  I 
have chosen dual earners as my unit of analysis because most workers approaching 
retirement fall into this demographic group1 and women’s increased engagement in paid 
work throughout their lives has potentially altered the way in which such couples manage 
the retirement process (Moen et al. 2006). The high-powered couple in which both 
partners have demanding professional careers is not the only type of dual-earner couple, 
and it does not even constitute the majority (Becker and Moen 1999).  Dual earner 
couples engage in a variety of work-family strategies across the life course, thereby 
providing the impetus to further study how husbands and wives balance the demands of 
work and family differently along the path to retirement. With women more committed 
and invested in their careers, the complexity of negotiating and coordinating their 
transition to retirement with their husbands may be greater for more recent cohorts of 
couples.  Furthermore, work factors such as pension eligibility, earnings, and health 
insurance may be more central to the retirement decisions of career-oriented women than 
family responsibilities or their husband’s employment situation.  Since women from more 
recent cohorts have placed greater importance on labor force activity and derived more 
benefits from it than their predecessors (Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai 2011), their 
                                                 






spouses may exert less influence on their retirement behavior than women from earlier 
cohorts.  Conversely, husbands from later cohorts may be more responsive to their wives’ 
employment activity than earlier cohorts.  Thus, research on the retirement patterns of 
dual-earning marital partners will provide valuable information on how wives’ 
employment histories and circumstances influence the retirement dynamics of couples 
and whether or not these retirement dynamics have changed across cohorts. 
I have selected baby boom cohorts born in the late 1940s and 1950s to compare 
with pre-baby boom cohorts born in the mid-1930s because of the dramatic cultural and 
economic changes boomers encountered and the life choices they made.   Members of the 
baby boom generation came of age when large macro forces set in motion changes in the 
workplace. The move from an industrial to a service-based economy has led to the 
proliferation of contingent work, flexible labor markets, and a decline in defined-benefit 
pensions (Karp 2007; Mermin, Johnson, and Murphy 2007; Neckerman and Torche 2007; 
O’Rand and Farkas 2002).  The women’s rights movement and other structural shifts led 
to many more women entering the labor market for long term careers, changing the 
household division of labor and the way marital partners plan for the future (Bianchi 
2000; Goldin 2006; O’Rand and Farkas 2002). As economic transformation altered the 
relationship workers had with employers in ways that made jobs less secure, higher 
divorce rates and the rise of single parenthood also made the family composition of many 
baby boomers more diverse than in the past (Bouvier, Leon F. and De Vita 1991).  The 
greater prevalence of divorce disproportionately disadvantaged women, who have lower 
remarriage rates and are more likely to experience a decline in economic resources 





new phase in how couples and individuals manage retirement.  Understanding how baby 
boom cohorts, whose oldest members are just entering traditional retirement ages, are 
behaving differently in this changed climate will provide us a picture of how retirement 
will look for decades to come.  
The ensuing chapters present a review of the literature and conceptual framework, 
an explanation of data and methods, and a discussion of my findings.  Chapter 2 provides 
a review of previous research on the retirement process and how changes in the U.S. 
economy and gender system have reshaped this life course transition for individuals and 
couples. In Chapter 3, I offer an overview of the conceptual framework for this 
dissertation and present my hypotheses. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the data, sample, 
variables, and methods of analysis and includes a discussion of my plan of analysis for 
this dissertation.  
Chapters 5 to 7 are my results chapters.  Chapter 5 addresses retirement 
expectations and the extent to which spouses in more recent cohorts exert more or less 
influence on their spouse’s retirement expectations, compared with earlier cohorts.  
Chapter 6 focuses on retirement expectations as well, but the unit of analysis changes 
from the individual to the couple-level. Specifically, I focus on whether or not spouses 
synchronize each other’s planned retirement year and to what degree wife, husband, and 
household characteristics influence expected spousal retirement order.  Chapter 7 moves 
beyond retirement expectations to model actual retirement timing using event history 
models. I follow individuals from three cohorts for up to eight years after their baseline 
interview, examining how much husbands and wives influence each other’s retirement 





the findings and their implications, and a discussion of the limitations of the study as well 





Chapter 2. Literature 
The predominant 20th Century models of retirement focused on the unilateral 
movement of men from full-time work to complete retirement.  Functionalist concepts 
such as role differentiation considered gender roles highly distinguished across the life 
course. Women's roles existed mainly in the domestic sphere while men participated in 
the labor force (Henretta and Angela 1983).  Men were the main decision makers 
concerning retirement as they were the primary earners and the ones who possessed 
benefits such as Social Security and occupational pensions (Hardy 2002). For couples, 
work drove men's retirement patterns while women retired due to family or spousal-
related reasons (Pienta 2003). The paid work of wives who were in the labor force was 
seen as secondary, meaning such women generally followed the lead of their spouse and 
retired when their husband was ready (Henretta, O’Rand, and Chan 1993).  
According to traditional life-cycle models, early life course events were not 
considered to be as important as factors affecting individuals closer to retirement 
(Henretta et al. 1993). Models developed by economists typically supported this notion, 
finding that pension coverage, wealth accruals, Social Security, and Medicare accounted 
for much of the variation in retirement preferences (Samwick 1998; Santos and Ferreira 
2011). Finally, the prevailing retirement transition consisted of leaving full time work to 
join the ranks of the completely retired (Cahill, Giandrea, and Quinn 2006; Giandrea, 
Cahill, and Quinn 2009). Transitions that consisted of moving from full time to part time 
work and then complete retirement were not commonplace.   
However true (or untrue) this traditional view of retirement and the family was in 





today.  The work characteristics of people as they reach retirement age are important, but 
previous employment history and circumstances also provide constraints and 
opportunities for individuals as they face retirement.  Furthermore, changing labor force 
trends for women have broken down many of the old gender roles that separated the two 
sexes. The work histories of couples (especially women) approaching retirement today 
are more diverse, which has opened up more pathways to retirement and more 
complexity for marital partners who want or need to synchronize their retirement.  
Finally, workers often gradually reduce their time spent in paid work, with many partially 
retiring and engaging in “bridge jobs” before completely exiting the labor force (Cahill et 
al. 2006; Giandrea et al. 2009).  In this literature review, I discuss the changing context of 
retirement, especially two recent trends that have altered traditional notions of retirement 
for couples: changes in the relationship between employers and workers as a result of 
economic restructuring, and women’s increased labor force participation throughout their 
lives.  I then consider how retirement expectations and joint retirement are influenced by 
these market-based changes, as well as other social forces.  
Determinants of Retirement 
The timing and way in which people move into retirement has become more 
varied over the past few decades in response to structural changes in the labor market. 
Most companies have abandoned generous defined-benefit pensions and mandatory 
retirement policies and retirement packages that encourage workers to retire early 
(Kinsella and Phillips 2005; Smith and Moen 1998). As a result, the century long decline 
in labor force participation among older age groups (from 1880 to 1980) has reversed and 





preferences vary greatly, leading to much heterogeneity in how people respond to 
changes in retirement benefit systems (Hanel and Riphahn 2012; Santos and Ferreira 
2011). As some economists have pointed out, individuals retire when the gains brought 
by market work are not high enough to offset the loss in utility that comes from 
sacrificing leisure (Samwick 1998).  The utility that individuals derive from leisure or 
paid work, however, varies according to endogenous preferences and the way in which 
social institutions such as Social Security and pensions affect those preferences (Santos 
and Ferreira 2011). 
 The first pillar of retirement security in the U.S. is Social Security. The 
overwhelmingly majority of employers and individuals pay payroll taxes in order to 
provide a nearly universal pension that individuals can access as early as age 62 or as late 
as 70.  The goal of Social Security is to provide a basic financial foundation for retirees, 
protecting them from poverty in old age by providing them with a monthly benefit (that is 
also adjusted annually for cost-of-living increases) that will be there for people even if 
they exhaust their personal savings.   
The second pillar of retirement security in the U.S. is employer-provided 
pensions.  Not all workers have access to pensions, with only 43% of private workers 
participating in some kind of pension plan in 2012, but the majority of private employers 
(52 percent) offered some sort of occupational pension in 2012, and most employees near 
retirement age have access to a plan (Giandrea et al. 2009; Munnell, Cahill, and Jivan 
2003; Munnell, Fraenkel, and Hurwitz 2012; Pienta 2003). Individuals who participate 
either receive a defined-benefit plan (DB), a defined-contribution plan (DC), or both. A 





upon reaching a certain age and years of service to an employer.  Defined-contribution 
plans are special retirement savings accounts that workers contribute to pretax, often with 
a match from their employer, and may start withdrawing without penalty at age 59 and 
one-half.  Defined-contribution plans carry greater risk for the worker because their value 
is not set as with defined-benefit pensions, but they do have the advantage of portability, 
as individuals can “rollover” these accounts without penalty into independent retirement 
accounts upon changing employers. In 1992, approximately 59 percent of individuals 
aged 51 to 56 had some type of private pension coverage. By 2004, nearly the same 
proportion (61 percent) of people aged 51 to 56 had a pension plan (Maestas 2007).   
While the defined-benefit pension plans never covered a majority of workers, the 
proportion of employers offering such a plan to their employees has noticeably declined 
(Poterba et al. 2006).  Defined-benefit plans usually provide a source of fixed monthly 
income for retirees, requiring employers to adequately fund pension programs or risk 
being unable to meet promised obligations.  Finding that DB plans are too costly, many 
employers have moved to offering defined-contribution plans, which require individuals 
to be disciplined and more diligently save throughout their working lives in order to 
possess an adequate sum to sustain themselves in retirement. Employers usually match a 
given percentage that employees save in defined-contribution plans, but do not have to 
worry about the solvency of their workers' funds, freeing companies from a substantial 
amount of long-term risk.   
The structural shift in the provision from DB to DC pensions has major 
consequences for the timing and coordination of retirement for individuals and couples. 





pensions because these plans often encouraged early retirement and even made it 
mandatory in some cases (Brown 2006; Choi 2002; Ruhm 1995).  Defined-contribution 
plans, however, incentivize individuals to put off retirement because the returns on 
investments made in these retirement accounts tend to be greater the more an individual 
saves and the longer an individual delays the withdrawal of funds (Munnell et al. 2003). 
While defined-benefit plans typically have a maximum monthly payout (for life), there is 
no limit to how much money can accrue in retirement accounts such as 401k’s and 
403b’s.  The downside of defined-contribution plans is that workers bear most of the risk 
instead of the employer and the balance in such accounts can fluctuate greatly depending 
on market trends and whether the worker withdrew any funds prematurely without 
replacing them. As a result, downturns in the economy can force individuals who are 
ready to leave the labor force to put off retirement until their investments have recovered 
from any losses.     
In addition to savings vehicles and pension programs, an individual's lifetime 
work history impacts the retirement decision and how closely linked it is to their spouse. 
A number of prior experiences (i.e. contextual antecedents) can impact the retirement 
transition.  The experience of layoffs and multiple periods of unemployment make it 
more difficult to accumulate wealth levels sufficient enough to retire. Henretta, O'Rand, 
and Chan's (1993) research on the 1982 Social Security Beneficiary Study found that 
wives employed during their childbearing years were more likely to retire around the 
same time as their husband than wives who had not engaged in paid work in their 
childbearing years.  The experience of layoffs and multiple periods of unemployment can 





are less likely to retire together if the loss of a job forces one spouse into retirement 
(Johnson 2004).  
Work histories can profoundly affect women’s preferences about whether and 
when to retire. Women with several intermittent periods of employment may be less 
attached to the labor force and more likely to leave when their husbands decide to retire 
(O’Rand and Henretta 1982).  Those with a lifelong career may not only be more 
attached to their employment out of enjoyment but also for accrued benefits they will 
receive for a lifetime of work (O’Rand and Farkas 2002).  Longer periods in the labor 
force often lead to promotions, higher salaries, and opportunities to pursue more varied 
and interesting assignments, making work more satisfying and meaningful.  More years 
in the labor force also means a person is more likely to be eligible for retirement benefits 
for which someone with a short work history does not qualify.  For example, most 
employers that offer DB pensions require employees to work a considerable amount of 
time (20 years or more) before the individual is fully vested.  And the higher a person’s 
base salary, the greater their potential pension is worth. Accordingly, women who are 
close to receiving such benefits may be less responsive to the retirement timing of their 
husbands.  
Much research has focused on the association between retirement and personal 
health. A common reason for retirement, especially early retirement, is poor physical 
health, while individuals who report being in good health are more likely to retire later 
(Denaeghel, Mortelmans, and Borghgraef 2011).  Individuals engaged in physically 
demanding tasks or experiencing stressful work conditions increases the chance of early 





problems (Blekesaune and Solem 2005).  Poor health does not always lead to early 
retirement, as health problems often require great amounts of income to pay for treatment 
(Gustman and Steinmeier 2004). For some, however, their health worsens to the point 
where work is no longer an option even if they face enormous medical costs, leading 
many who withdraw from the labor force prior to Social Security eligibility to utilize 
disability insurance or special unemployment insurance programs as an income source. 
Despite declines in disability (Wise 2010), roughly 40 percent of retirees retire earlier 
than anticipated for reasons such as health problems and disability (Rix 2009).   
Some of the biggest financial and care obligations for individuals pertain to their 
family. As a result, scholars usually look at what support obligations older workers have. 
The presence of children or other dependents in the household or elsewhere can alter the 
likelihood of individuals withdrawing from the labor force (Denaeghel et al. 2011).  The 
effects of such support, however, often differ by gender. Men who provide care to family 
members often delay retirement, while women in similar situations are more likely to 
retire (Denaeghel et al. 2011).  
A number of long term demographic trends have further constrained middle-age 
workers approaching retirement and increased their family responsibilities. The increase 
in life expectancy has made it more likely that parents will be alive, creating significant 
care burdens for some.  At the same time, rates of adult children residing with parents 
have increased and placed additional pressures on middle-aged couples' resources (Kahn, 
Goldscheider, and Garcia-Manglano 2013). The dramatic increase in the cost of higher 
education, coupled with later childbearing, means that many parents face large expenses 





some cases, the limited resources of adult children has led older workers to care for 
grandchildren (Wang and Marcotte 2007). These mounting familial obligations may 
significantly alter the retirement decision making process.  
Recent demographic and economic trends have not only delayed the timing of 
retirement but also led to many different retirement pathways.  The most traditional 
pathway is the movement from full-time paid employment to complete retirement, or no 
paid employment. For numerous reasons, individuals are increasingly likely to retire 
gradually, moving from full-time employment into part-time "bridge jobs" (Ruhm 1995).  
Recent research even shows that a majority of older Americans experience retirement as 
a gradual process rather than a single event, including members from pre-baby boom 
cohorts (Cahill et al. 2006; Giandrea et al. 2009).   
Many people who engage in part-time work do eventually transition to complete 
retirement.  Changes in Social Security have in part encouraged the elderly to stay in the 
labor force for longer, as individuals no longer have to completely retire in order to 
collect Social Security, the minimum age for full benefits has increased, and the system 
rewards people who delay the receipt of Social Security until age 70 with higher monthly 
payments (Johnson 2004).  But many people partially retire rather than completely retire 
out of economic necessity, and some never fully exit the labor force. With so many 
couples co-surviving into old age, the ability of the baby boom generation to completely 
retire in their later years without running out of savings has come into question (Moore 
and Mitchell 1997), raising the need to understand how this generation is thinking about 







The Gender Revolution 
Outside of the traditional determinants of retirement such as health and the 
structure of workplace benefits, sweeping changes in the gender system in the United 
States during the latter half of the 20th century has had major implications for the 
retirement process.  During this time period, major structural, ideological, and legislative 
changes opened up significant opportunities for women. In 1970, less than half of all 
women aged 25 to 54 worked for pay, but this percentage increased to over 70 by the 
mid-1990s (England 2010). In addition to women’s participation in the labor force 
dramatically increasing, rates of college graduation improved, the gender wage gap 
narrowed, several kinds of gender discrimination in employment became illegal, and 
many male-dominated occupations substantially desegregated (Cotter, Hermsen, and 
Vanneman 2011; England 2010).  These advancements have become known as the 
“gender revolution”.  
One of the main drivers behind the dramatic increase in women's labor force 
participation was the rise of married women in the work force. Whereas young and 
unmarried women constituted the bulk of women in the first half of the twentieth century, 
massive increases in demand for female workers were met by a large increase in married 
women's employment (Goldin 2006).  Many of these married women were also mothers, 
as the percentage of mothers in the labor force rose from around 38 to 67 percent 
(Smolensky and Gootman 2003). 
According to Goldin (1990) and others (Casper and Bianchi 2002; Rosenfeld 
1996), a number of economic and demographic factors brought about women's increased 





enabled women to earn better wages than before. Second, the proliferation of white collar 
jobs provided women with a much more attractive workplace than many of the 
traditionally female-dominated jobs in the past.  The expansion of the service sector also 
put female labor in greater demand.  These jobs reduced the stigma towards married 
women working, who were profitable to employ, and showed that the workplace was a 
decent place for them (Goldin 2006).   
The increase in paid employment not only provided women with additional 
income but also numerous forms of social protection for retirement. Ten years of 
participation in the labor force entitles individuals to Social Security (U.S. Social 
Security Administration 2013), which is the predominant income source for many seniors 
and one of the three pillars of retirement (state pension, occupational pension, and private 
savings). In addition, many jobs offer pensions, life insurance, and health care benefits.  
Health benefits may include health insurance in retirement as well as access to long term 
care insurance.  
Women on average still face lower earnings and are more likely to have 
discontinuous work histories compared to men. The "gendered" life course that many 
women have experienced has placed family demands such as childrearing at odds with 
paid employment, making it more difficult to access jobs with retirement benefits and 
wages adequate enough to accumulate savings. Previous research has shown that women 
in dual-earning couples often “scale back” their career and work ambitions while raising 
young children (Becker and Moen 1999).  In part to existing norms and patterns of 
gender socialization, wives face greater pressure than husbands to reduce work hours in 





other forms of cumulative disadvantage across the life course.  Employment gaps and 
periods of part-time work may lower pension coverage or income available upon 
retirement. Gaps in income and pension eligibility are interrelated, with research 
attributing two-thirds of the pension coverage gap to lower earnings among women 
(Johnson 2004).  
At the same time, work-related deficits have shrunk over the latter half of the 
twentieth century and women's employment has become more similar to men's, as the 
percentage of women entitled to pension income has increased, in addition to the size of 
their payouts (Even and Macpherson 2004).  Women now are much more likely to 
intensively build up their own human capital, investing in education and training 
necessary to enter careers in more lucrative occupations that offer retirement benefits.  A 
study by Farkas and O'Rand (Farkas and O’Rand 1998) appears to confirm this, as their 
results show that women born in the mid-1940s to early 1950s were more likely to have 
an occupational pension than women born in the late 1920s and 1930s.  Even and 
MacPherson’s (2004) analysis provides additional evidence, showing that the percentage 
of nonemployed women over age 65 receiving a private pension doubled from 11 percent 
in 1975 to 22 percent in 2000.  The average pension benefit for women also rose 
substantially over the same time, increasing from around $800 (in 2000 dollars) to about 
$1900 (Even and Macpherson 2004).  Still, the average pension benefit for men was 
much higher during the same time period, increasing from roughly $3600 to $6400. 
The changes in women's work lives also brought about changes in the timing of 
families. The average ages at first marriage and first birth have risen in response to 





The delay of marriage and childbearing has positive effects for women's economic 
resources upon retirement, as putting off major family events increases their chances of 
remaining in the labor force later in life and allows them to spend more time earning 
valuable education and work experience in jobs that provide retirement benefits such as 
employer provided pensions (Pienta 1999).  And with women becoming more invested in 
their careers, they are also less likely to leave the labor force for extended periods of 
time, enabling them to save more and making them less likely to lose pension coverage.  
Despite these changes, gender inequalities in lifetime earnings mean women often receive 
smaller pension incomes and are unable to save as much as men, putting them at a 
disadvantage as they face the retirement process.  For example, the persistent wage 
penalty mothers face means their private pensions are often smaller than their male 
counterparts, thereby reducing some of their bargaining power with their husbands 
(Budig and England 2001; Even and Macpherson 2004).   
The advancements of the gender revolution are likely to have altered the 
retirement decision making process for couples in two important ways. First, the 
increased labor force participation of women has made couples more likely to need to 
consider both spouses’ work histories and retirement options, rather than just the 
husbands’.  The shift in women’s labor force activity is especially pronounced among 
baby-boom women, of which 75 percent took part in paid work when they were between 
the ages of 25-44 (Bouvier, Leon F. and De Vita 1991).  Less than half of their female 
predecessors were working outside the home 20 years prior.  Some of these women did 
not leave the labor force for long periods because they needed the income, but many 





sense of purpose and identity from it.  With more women having worked for most or all 
of their adult lives, they increasingly carry their own pension and health insurance 
coverage.  
Second, the increased resources of wives have altered the negotiating process 
within couples and given women more power during the retirement decision-making 
process. The decision to retire has the potential of being beneficial or detrimental, 
depending on the viewpoint of the person making the transition out of the labor force.  In 
some cases, it is a welcome new chapter in life, while in other cases it is done to 
accommodate personal or familial needs.  With women often bringing substantial 
resources to the household, the relative power advantage for men has lessened and 
relationships have become more egalitarian, enabling women to pursue whatever path 
best serves their own self-interest (Moen et al. 2006).  To be sure, inequality at work and 
home continues to result in fewer market resources and less bargaining power for 
numerous women. Nevertheless, the improved economic position of many women means 
that couples need to coordinate their retirement plans together more so now than in the 
past (Choi 2002).   
Retirement Expectations 
Factors influencing the retirement transition not only include people's life 
histories and present context but also what they expect to occur in the future.  As a result, 
scholars have developed models of retirement expectations because they find that the 
expectations individuals create are associated with the decisions they make later.  In fact, 





expectations about the timing of retirement" (Bernheim 1987:2). Nevertheless, many 
issues regarding retirement expectations remain to be explored.   
One area of interest is what individual characteristics are related to retirement 
expectations. A number of individual characteristics influence retirement expectations, 
including education, gender, market resources, work environment, and health status.  
Over time, more people from all levels of education expect to continue working full-time 
after age 65, but those with college degrees are most likely. Reasons include higher 
average earnings, better health, and less-physically demanding workplaces.  Although 
some women may work longer than initially planned, they generally expect to retire at 
earlier ages than men (Karp 2007).  Bernheim's (1987) work on the Social Security 
Administration's Retirement History Study found that people's forecasts for when they 
would retire were highly consistent with the actual timing of retirement, but men's 
retirement expectations were more accurate than women’s.  In particular, he found that 
married women tend to work longer than anticipated and that this discrepancy between 
expectations and reality was only partly explained by spousal age differences.  People's 
estimates of how long they expect to work hinge in part on how long they expect to live 
or remain in good health.  How individuals perceive their overall health has been shown 
to influence retirement expectations, with those in poor health more likely to have 
expectations for early retirement (Hall and Johnson 1980; McGarry 2004).  People's 
projected life expectancy is often quite close to actuarial projections, so people who plan 
to retire early because they do not expect a long life span are often correct (Perozek 
2008). Besides life expectancy, individuals who highly value their time outside of work 





Johnson 1980; Honig 1996; Pienta and Hayward 2002).  At the same time, people with 
repetitive jobs still need the resources to retire early and are not likely to expect an early 
retirement if they do not have the means to do so. If individual savings are high, a 
pension is available, and their employer provides health insurance in retirement, then they 
are more likely to expect to retire at a younger age (Pienta and Hayward 2002).  
While some people's retirement expectations may be stable, they often change 
over time,  particularly as life presents unforeseen problems and opportunities (Coile 
2004; Dwyer 2001; Wong and Hardy 2009). With more longitudinal data on retirement 
expectations, examining how different economic and health shocks modify expectations 
has become an exciting area of research.  Unexpected health shocks are associated with 
withdrawal from the labor force earlier than planned (Coile 2004; Dwyer 2001).  A 
medical crisis from a heart attack or cancer is common for people in their 50s and can 
lead to a loss of cognitive or physical functioning, prompting the individual to 
temporarily leave the labor force (Coile 2004). If the afflicted person is married, their 
spouse may work more to offset the loss of income, but often times the marital partner 
must also reduce work in order to provide care, leaving these individuals with few 
attractive options for retirement planning (Johnson and Favreault 2001).        
In the midst of large social and economic changes over the past 50 years, 
expectations related to work and retirement have substantially altered, providing fertile 
ground for analysis.  Data from the Health and Retirement Study and other studies show 
that in the 2000s more people in their 50s expect to work full-time after age 65 than in the 
1990s (Karp 2007; Mermin et al. 2007; Sargent-Cox et al. 2012). Yet, limited research 





work focuses on what leads individuals to expect to retire at younger ages.  We do know 
that women who are life-long members of the labor force tend to delay retirement 
compared to women with interrupted careers, but we do not know if this means women 
who are highly attached to the labor force retire after their spouse leaves work.  
Not much literature covers spousal influence on retirement expectations, but some 
evidence shows that spousal characteristics impact retirement expectations, net of 
individual characteristics (Pienta and Hayward 2002). Married individuals usually 
consider their spouse’s retirement expectations and factor in their spouse’s pension 
resources and personal health when formulating their own expectations (Benitez-Silva 
and Dwyer 2006).  Compared to the initial expectations of couples, the proportion who 
do retire together is rather low (Ho and Raymo 2009).  Health shocks, family caregiving 
responsibilities, and other unforeseen events can alter retirement expectations, causing 
some people to retire earlier than expected.  In general, couples are more likely to realize 
their expectations if they plan together, but with so many economic and family factors to 
consider for retirement, many couples have a hard time aligning their expectations.  
 Traditionally, scholars have considered men’s retirement expectations to take 
priority over their wives, even in dual-earner households (Honig 1996; Moen et al. 2006). 
Husband’s careers were thought to have priority in the household, with wives’ careers 
trajectories more dependent on their spouse (Becker and Moen 1999).  As a result, 
scholars understood husband’s retirement expectations to influence their wives’ 
expectations much more than the reverse. With many women now possessing full work 
histories and contributing major retirement savings for the household, there is reason to 





play a larger role than in the past.  For more recent cohorts such as the baby boomers, 
most women should have developed their own expectations that take into account their 
own best interests, which may or not match the expectations of their husbands. In short, 
the increase of women’s resources has the potential to make relationships more 
egalitarian.   
Realizing Joint Retirement 
In conjunction with the study of how spouses influence each other’s retirement 
expectations and timing is a small but growing literature on joint retirement, which 
researchers typically define as both partners exiting the labor force within 12 months of 
each other. Not every couple desires joint retirement, nor is such an arrangement 
considered an unequivocal good, but the proportion that does is substantial enough to 
warrant research on what makes this retirement trajectory possible. A number of 
intervening factors can mitigate the effect of one’s spouse’s retirement on one’s own 
retirement decisions, and these intervening factors lead most couples to retire at different 
times, as previous findings show that only around one-third of married-couples retire 
together (Ho and Raymo 2009; Johnson 2004).  
Compared to the initial expectations of couples, the proportion who do retire 
together is rather low, but wives and husbands who plan and expect to retire jointly are 
more than four times likely to do so than couples in which neither partner planned to 
retire at the same (Ho and Raymo 2009). In general, couples are more likely to realize 
their expectations if they retire at later ages, worry less about their income sufficiency in 
retirement (even after controlling for net worth), and discuss retirement more often 





A number of structural constraints impede or raise the likelihood of joint 
retirement.  Large age differences tend to make it more it more difficult to retire at the 
same time, in part because of substantial dissimilarity in the age of eligibility for 
retirement benefits. Couples in which both spouses have become eligible for Medicare 
and Social Security are much more likely to retire together.  Couples with defined-benefit 
pension plans generally have an easier time realizing joint retirement, as they do not have 
to worry about market fluctuations altering their potential retirement income in the way 
that people with defined-contribution pensions plans do (O’Rand and Farkas 2002). 
Economic factors such as the wages, assets levels, and health insurance coverage of a 
spouse all impact the amount of influence one’s spouse exerts on the retirement decision. 
In general, dual earner couples where both spouses bring in a similar amount of income 
decreases the odds of joint retirement, meaning the likelihood of retiring together is lower 
when the relative earnings of each spouse are more equal (Ho and Raymo 2009).  The 
reasons for this may be that the coordination of retirement is more difficult.  With each 
spouse having to deal with how retirement affects their economic resources, aligning the 
interest of both partners may not be feasible. For example, wives with their own 
employer-provided health coverage tend to delay retirement if they cannot continue such 
coverage upon retirement. In such instances, the incentive to wait until the age of 
Medicare eligibility usually outweighs joint retirement unless their husband has access to 
employer-sponsored health insurance for retirees.  
The constraints individuals encounter from the workplace or the state are not the 
only forces impacting joint retirement.  The responsibilities and obligations people bear 





parents, and providing for dependent children or grandchildren can alter the timing of 
retirement.  Research on the effect of spousal health has not produced definitive 
conclusions. O’Rand and Farkas (2002) found that the effect depended on which spouse 
was in poor health, with wives being more likely to retire first when their husbands 
exhibit health limitations and poor health among wives increasing the chances of joint 
retirement (O’Rand and Farkas 2002).  The reason for why wives would retire first if the 
husbands have work-related health limitations is unclear, but one possibility is that 
husbands with health limitations delay retirement in order to keep health insurance 
coverage while their wives retire first to provide caregiving.  Pienta and Hayward’s 
(2002) work showed that husbands’, but not wives’, work disability had a significant 
association on their spouse’s retirement expectations. On the other hand, Johnson and 
Favreault (2001) found that individuals, regardless of gender, were more likely to 
continue working when their spouses had serious health problems and could not work.  
While it remains unclear if there is gender differentiation in caring for spouses 
after controlling for age and other factors, the labor force decisions men and women 
make in supporting their aging parents do differ.  Research shows that when elderly 
parents need support, women tend to provide care, making them more likely to withdraw 
from the labor force or reduce the number of hours they work (Dentinger and Clarkberg 
2002).  Men, on the other hand, tend to provide financial support, making them more 
likely to delay retirement (Dentinger and Clarkberg 2002; Gignac, Kelloway, and 
Gottlieb 1996).   
The impact of financially dependent adult children on retirement timing is less 





participation (Elder and Rudolph 2000), but findings are mixed as to whether this drain 
on resources significantly impacts the retirement timing of fathers and mothers 
differently, with some studies showing that both parents continue to work (Szinovacz, 
DeViney, and Davey 2001) while others find that men are more likely than women to 
delay retirement when children are still present in the home (Pienta and Hayward 2002).  
One of the reasons scholars have studied the ability of couples to retire together is 
because of the ramifications it has for individual well-being.  In general, joint retirement 
has a beneficial influence for both spouses, and failure to achieve it can lead to stress and 
other negative outcomes (Szinovacz and Davey 2004, 2005).  For couples who express a 
preference for sharing leisure time with their spouse and want to spend more time with 
them, joint retirement is ideal (Blau 1998).  Retirement can disrupt daily routines and 
adjusting to this new phase of life alone can be stressful (Szinovacz and Davey 2004).  
Individuals who retire sequentially from their spouse sometimes experience depression 
and report increased levels of conflict with their marital partner than couples who retired 
jointly (Szinovacz and Davey 2004).  
The decision of when to retire often involves a bargaining process with the spouse 
that reflects each partner's relative power and authority in the relationship.  The timing of 
retirement can actually undermine a married retiree's satisfaction if it enhances the other 
partner's influence in the relationship. For couples in which the wife did not work earlier 
in the marriage, work and family roles often undergo a renegotiation process during the 
retirement transition (Henretta et al. 1993). A study by Moen and others (2001) also 
found that the retirement transition can lead to declines in marital quality for husbands 





associated with the greatest marital conflict. In some cases, the continued labor force 
participation of one spouse can lead to depressive symptoms for the retired partner 
(Szinovacz and Davey 2004).     
Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several ways.  By focusing on the 
importance of gender in the retirement decision-making process, this dissertation sheds 
light on the different ways husbands’ and wives’ lives are linked. Most of the work on 
joint retirement has yet to examine the baby boom cohorts, looking at only the first cohort 
in the HRS.  Since the experiences and behaviors of each cohort across the life course 
often differ from other generations, it will be important to see if spousal influence on the 
retirement transition for baby boomers contrasts with previous cohorts. Studies that 
follow individuals over time usually only analyze one cohort. This dissertation not only 
compares how baby boomers are different from previous cohorts at certain ages but also 
how they change over time. To my knowledge, no study exists that looks at how 
retirement expectations and timing change across multiple cohorts for several time points.  
An analysis of cohort change provides useful information on whether the collective 
experiences of a particular group leads to a different retirement process, but a comparison 
of baby boomers to earlier cohorts also shows how women's employment characteristics, 





Chapter 3. Conceptual Framework 
This study of joint retirement utilizes the life course framework  which posits that 
early events can affect choices and transitions later in life  (Curl and Townsend 2008; 
Smith and Moen 1998).  Several retirement researchers have developed models based on 
a life course framework, and they generally share an attention to how the present context 
of the transition matters as well as developments across the life course.  The decision to 
retire is embedded "within the framework of an individual's prior occupational trajectory 
and on-going situational and structural exigencies and opportunities", implying  that 
aging is connected to other life stages and processes (Moen 1996:131–132).  People's 
lives are linked to others, as life histories are considered interdependent with family and 
other individuals.  Major life course transitions such as retirement depend on context, 
suggesting that people make decisions within the bounds of the constraints and 
opportunities afforded to them during their past and present (Szinovacz and Davey 2004). 
The location of individuals in time and place influence their development, as the 
historical period they find themselves in shapes their personal biography. While social 
forces may limit the options of individuals by institutionalizing certain life course events, 
transitions are still highly variable (Han and Moen 1999; Henretta 1992).  The diverse 
arrangement of events allow for great complexity and individuals to follow multiple 
pathways. This dissertation draws from the life course perspective by placing great 
attention on the pathways and trajectories people take towards retirement.  
 In the case of retirement, an individual's work history, health, and finances impact 
the timing of retirement.  The concept of "linked life spheres" shows that the retirement 





a spouse's employment and retirement prospects also influence the transition.  With a 
focus on context, the life course perspective also looks at the structural forces that have 
institutionalized retirement. Social and economic changes produce norms and 
expectations regarding the nature and timing of retirement decisions.    
Phyllis Moen was one of the first to theorize on how retirement is best understood 
through a life course perspective. Moen explained that retirement was not a static event 
but a transition that requires one to look at change within individuals as well as changes 
within the environment in which they are situated.  Although retirement is an objective 
transition, the psychological changes it engenders such as identity, expectations, and 
preferences make it a subjective transformation as well. These subjective components 
affect the choices people make regarding retirement, in addition to aspects of their 
institutional environment (Moen 1996). The opportunity structure changes over time and 
therefore differentially shapes the experiences across birth cohorts.  The realm of 
possibilities for a given individual nearing retirement can vary widely depending on the 
world they initially entered as they started their working lives.  Large policy changes 
from governments or companies while a person is of working age may have great 
implications on the norms and expectations for retirement.  The institutional environment 
also shapes past experiences, such as the kind of family, education, and employment 
opportunities one had earlier in life, which in turn influences the kind of options a person 
has regarding retirement in the present.   
According to Moen, the cohort a person belongs to is not the only factor reflecting 
what kind of structural constraints an individual has across the life course. Gender also 





the kind of paid work a person finds, as well as the timing and length of employment. 
The kind of employment a person engages in then shapes the resources, barriers, and 
opportunities an individual has to prepare for retirement. Moen (1996) further theorizes 
that the retirement pathways of women are more diverse than those for men because of 
the large changes in women's roles over the past several decades. As a result, the 
ramifications of retirement on health and other factors may differ by gender.  
Retirement researchers use a number of methods to incorporate life course factors 
into their models, but one of the most common ways of studying retirement as a life 
course transition is by using longitudinal data.  A notable example of applying a life 
course model on retirement comes from Han and Moen's study (Han and Moen 1999) of 
couples in upstate New York.  They used birth cohort to measure historical context and a 
socioeconomic index to show the kind of career trajectory participants had in terms of 
occupation, organization, and work status. Occupational statuses ranged greatly among 
the career pathways, with intermittent career-types being predominantly composed of 
clerical and low-wage workers, and "high-gear" career types consisting mainly of people 
in executive and management positions.  They found that the birth cohort one belongs to 
significantly affects target retirement age and the actual age of retirement. The timing of 
retirement also varied greatly depending on the type of career pathway one chose. 
Another example comes from Curl and Townshend (2008), who used the Health and 
Retirement Study to follow a single cohort of dual earning married couples for eight 
years, finding that about half of all married pairs experience the same number of 
transitions and that husbands are more likely to transition into partial retirement than 





Many data sets have variables that seek to capture biographical circumstances and 
a person's work and family position across the life course.  These variables include age at 
first marriage, age at first child, and number and length of jobs held.  For example, 
Henretta, O'Rand, and Chan's (1993) life course study looked at timing and number of 
children, as well as how many years wives worked during their childbearing years, 
finding that wives' lifetime work histories shaped the retirement transitions of husbands. 
Women who worked during their childbearing years were more likely to retire at the 
same time as their husband than women who did not work for pay while raising children. 
Smith and Moen's (Smith and Moen 1998) analysis of the Cornell Retirement and Well-
Being Study also examined women's work histories, looking at whether wives being 
homemakers or possessing intermittent or uninterrupted work histories affected how 
husbands perceive the influence of their spouse on the retirement decision.  Unlike the 
study by Henretta, O’Rand, and Chan, Smith and Moen (1998) did not find a significant 
association between wives work histories and husbands thinking they were influential in 
the retirement process. Instead, they found that having a wife with a modern gender 
ideology and discussing retirement plans with them were positively related to husbands 
thinking their wife was influential on their retirement decisions. 
Conceptual Model       
Figure 1 shows the relationship between retirement outcomes and past and current 
experiences as well as demographic and spousal factors.  Factors influencing the 
retirement process include age, retirement savings, health, pension access, work 
conditions, and employment history.  The upper box labeled “historical context” 





context in which a person is embedded, which subsequently shapes the past and current 
experiences of individuals and their husbands or wives. Individuals from different birth 
cohorts experience social and economic changes at distinct ages, producing differences in 
their work and family lives, which in turn produce changes in the timing and nature of 
retirement. Examples include the shift by companies from defined-benefit pensions to 
defined-contribution policies or the raising of the age of full eligibility for Social Security 
from 65 to 67.  Other changes not as directly related to retirement can also have 
consequences for when and how people retire. For example, changes in the occupational 
structure has resulted in more women participating in paid employment, thereby altering 
both men’s and women’s retirement.  
[Insert Figure 3.1 here] 
To reflect an individual’s constraints and opportunities, I have divided the time-
variant factors into past and current experiences (Moen 1996).  An arrow from the past 
experiences box points towards the current experiences box to indicate that decisions 
made across the life course influence a person’s current position by influencing the 
trajectories and pathways people take.  For example, one way to examine the impact of 
class on retirement is to look at education, which opens and closes different occupations 
and employment pathways.  In turn, a person’s work trajectory affects the resources a 
person accumulates over time and has at the present to prepare for retirement. Education 
also shapes work conditions and time spent in the labor force. People who are well 
educated in professional jobs may not only be more likely to receive an occupational 
pension but will be less likely to engage in physically demanding work or experience 





major consequences for a person’s health, another determinant of retirement, as the 
resources and demands bestowed on a person can have beneficial or deleterious physical 
and psychological effects.  In line with the theory of cumulative dis/advantage, this 
dissertation holds that advantages at younger ages lead to greater resources and material 
well-being at older ages (O’Rand 1996). 
The hypotheses in this dissertation assume that the decision to retire occurs at the 
individual level, but acknowledge that a person’s choice may be highly influenced by 
their husband or wife, though this effect is likely to have changed over time.  
Accordingly, the conceptual framework accounts for both individual and spousal 
characteristics within the context of different cohorts. I assume that both spouses will 
increasingly respond to their own characteristics and resources, but wives’ decisions will 
be less driven by their husbands’ needs.  At the same time, I still expect retirement 
outcomes to differ for husbands and wives due to gender inequality affecting the barriers, 
resources, and opportunities people face across the life course.   
Many scholars have long asserted that the primary determinants of retirement for 
men are related to work matters, such as occupation, pension status, and health (Pienta 
2003).  For women, the motivations for retirement were considered to stem primarily 
from spousal and familial factors.  In short, scholars have long contended that husbands 
and wives respond to different individual and household constraints and opportunities 
with regards to retirement.  
Whereas work may hold less importance for women with truncated work lives, I 
argue that women with lifelong careers follow a different model, which in turn alters the 





factors will color the retirement decisions of women more if they spend greater portions 
of their lives working and deriving market resources from their employment, such as 
health insurance and a pension.  The resources they bring to the household will in turn 
influence the retirement decision of their husbands, meaning the retirement transition of 
husbands with work-driven partners will respond more to the circumstances of their 
spouse than husbands with wives who have placed greater emphasis on non-work roles. 
And since women from the baby boom cohort have had on average greater levels of labor 
force activity and higher earnings and benefits than women from older cohorts, the 
retirement of women from this cohort should be less contingent on their husband in 
general and more a function of their work life. 
Thus, spouses do matter, but the importance of one’s spouse on retirement 
becomes more equal across genders as spouses both become more committed to work. 
Financial factors are still important in explaining men’s retirement, just as spousal factors 
still matter for women, but the relative degree of importance shifts as women become 
more career focused.  The retirement patterns of people from dual earning couples 
become less gendered as a result of women’s increased labor force participation, with a 
combination of partners’ work history, current employment characteristics, and structural 
constraints impacting the likelihood of retirement for each member of the household. 
Hypotheses 
Below are the main hypotheses regarding retirement expectations.  Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b refer to changes within cohorts while hypotheses 2a and 2b refer to differences 
across cohorts.  Underlying all these hypotheses is the assumption that the factors 





women’s work resources grow.  Husbands who traditionally retired of their own volition 
will be increasingly influenced by their wives, and wives’ choices, which traditionally 
responded to their spouse’s retirement preferences, will become less driven by their 
husbands.  
Hypothesis 1a: The expected probability of working full time past age 65 for wives from 
dual earner couples becomes increasingly tied to wives’ own economic resources instead 
of their spouse’s retirement expectations, as women become more committed and 
attached to work and have greater relative economic resources compared to their 
husbands. For husbands, I hypothesize that their wives’ work attachment and relative 
economic resources will become an increasingly important determinant of husbands’ 
retirement expectations and decisions.  
Hypothesis 2a: Husbands’ expected probability of working full time past age 65 
influences wives’ retirement expectations in later cohorts less than in earlier cohorts.  
Wives’ expected probability of working full time past age 65 influences husbands’ 
retirement expectations in later cohorts more than in earlier cohorts. 
Hypothesis 1b: Wives will be less likely to retire before their husbands or have the same 
plans as their work attachment and relative economic resources increase. Couples will 
retire jointly (or have the same plans) when they both have the retirement resources to do 
so or have similar economic profiles. 
Hypothesis 2b: Couples in later cohorts will be more likely to synchronize their 






The following are the main hypotheses on retirement timing, with hypothesis 3 
describing changes within cohorts and hypothesis 4 describing changes across cohorts.   
Hypothesis 3: The retirement timing of wives becomes increasingly tied to wives’ own 
economic resources instead of their spouse’s retirement status, as women become more 
committed and attached to work and have greater relative economic resources compared 
to their husbands. For husbands, I hypothesize that their retirement timing becomes more 
connected to their wives’ retirement status as their wives’ work attachment and relative 
economic resources increase.   
Hypothesis 4: Husbands retirement timing influence wives’ retirement timing in later 
cohorts less than in earlier cohorts. Wives’ retirement timing influences husbands’ 







Chapter 4. Data and Design 
For my analyses, I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which 
is a nationally representative, multi-cohort longitudinal study of individuals aged 50 or 
older and their spouses.  Individuals are interviewed biennially and there are now 11 
waves of data available from 1992 to 2012. The survey includes people born from 1924 
to 1959 and uses a multistage area probability design to oversample Latinos, African 
Americans, and individuals who reside in Florida.  All measures used in this dissertation 
come from the RAND HRS Data file (version N), which is a version of the HRS that has 
undergone extensive cleaning and imputation for many of the wealth variables to make 
the HRS more user-friendly (RAND HRS Data, Version N). 
The sample design of the HRS entails four selection stages: 1) Two primary 
sampling units (i.e. PSUs) are chosen for each of the 56 strata. The PSUs are 
metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan area counties, with the selection probabilities 
proportionate to size; 2) Secondary sampling units (i.e. SSUs) are area segments selected 
within PSUs; 3) Random selection of households that contain at least one age-eligible 
person from within selected SSUs; and 4) The selection of one or more individuals within 
a sampled household. The sampled household may consist of a single unmarried person, 
a married couple in which both are age 50 or older, or a married couple in which only one 
spouse meets the age criteria.  To obtain unbiased parameter estimates and avoid 
inaccurate standard errors, the analyses in this dissertation take into account the complex 
design of the survey2.  
                                                 
2 The event history models in Chapter 7 include a cluster adjustment but are not declared to be survey data 





The HRS is an ideal source of data for this analysis for many reasons. First, it 
contains detailed information about retirement status, as well as family, health, and 
financial characteristics of individuals at or near retirement age.  The consistency of the 
data collection process allows researchers to analyze how a person's characteristics 
change over time and how such changes relate to retirement. Second, the HRS also asks 
respondents several questions regarding their retirement expectations and plans for the 
future, providing valuable information on how people's expectations line up with reality. 
Third, the HRS collects data in a symmetric manner by interviewing both respondents 
and their spouses, in contrast to many other data sets. Having access to information on 
both spouses allows one to examine the impact of a spouse's current characteristics and 
work history on the retirement decision making process.   
In this dissertation, I draw four samples of dual-earning couples at their baseline 
interviews.  While the language used throughout this proposal refers to husbands and 
wives, unmarried couple households are also included.  Each sample consists of a 
different 5-year birth cohort: pre-war babies (1936-1941), war babies (1942-1947), early 
baby boomers (1948-1953), and mid baby boomers (1954-1959). The survey incorporates 
a new cohort every six years where at least one person in the household is between the 
ages of 51 and 56, so each cohort has a different point of entry into the study: pre-war 
babies (ages 51-56 in 1992), war babies (ages 51-56 in 1998), early baby boomers (ages 
51-56 in 2004), and mid baby boomers (ages 51-56 in 2010). To be counted as a dual-
earning couple, both spouses must be working for pay (either part-time or full-time) and 
do not consider themselves retired at the baseline interview. To examine changes in the 





for four additional waves after their entry into the HRS, when respondents have reached 
the ages of 59 to 64. For example, the war baby cohort consists of dual-earning couples 
where at least one respondent is between the ages 51 and 56 in 1998. When analyzing 
this cohort longitudinally, I follow them for four waves of the HRS, which in this case is 
between the years 2000-2006.   
Outcome Measures 
The three main outcome variables are expected probability of working full-time 
after age 65, planned joint retirement year, and current retirement status for individuals 
who were part of a dual-earning couple household when they first entered the survey. I 
will use expected probability of work after 65 at the baseline interview for the first 
outcome measure, and then look at planned retirement year at baseline for the second 
outcome measure to examine the degree to which couples have joint or sequential 
retirement plans.  For the third outcome measure, retirement timing, I measure retirement 
status at each wave except the respondent's baseline interview.   
The first measure of retirement expectations represents a respondent’s self-
reported probability of working full-time after age 65, with answers ranging from 0 
(absolutely no chance) to 100 (absolutely certain).  The question is framed as follows: 
“Thinking about work generally and not just your present job, what do you think the 
chances are that you will be working full-time after you reach age 65?” Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 show the distribution of this measure for husbands and wives across all cohorts at 
their baseline interview.  Answers to this question are skewed, as responses cluster 
around 0 and 100.   To account for this dispersion, I utilize interval regression, which I 





[Insert Figures 4.1 and 4.2 here] 
The second measure of retirement expectations looks at what year respondents 
plan to stop working.  This measure derives from a two-step process. First, HRS 
respondents were asked: “Do you plan to stop working altogether or work fewer hours at 
a particular date or age, have you not given it much thought, or what.” Possible answers 
include stop work altogether, never stop work, haven’t given it much thought, or no 
current plans.  If the respondent plans to stop work altogether, they are asked: “At what 
age do you plan to stop working?”  Either an age or year can be given, but I convert all 
responses into year for this analysis so that spouses can be more easily compared.  
The HRS cohort (born 1936-1941) is not included in the analysis for this measure 
because differences in the question wording possibly led to very different responses for 
this group at their baseline interview. From waves 3 onward, respondents are asked at 
what age they think they will stop working if they say they have not given it (retirement) 
much thought or have no current plans.  In wave one, however, those who do not list an 
age in which they plan to stop working are asked when they think they will retire 
completely. As a result, far fewer HRS cohort respondents listed “never stop work” as a 
response than other cohorts.  
Two specifications of planned retirement year are utilized. The first measure of 
planned retirement year consists of three categories: wife expects to retire first, husband 
expects to retire first, or both spouses have the same plans.  The last category contains 
couples who either plan to retire in the same or adjacent year, do not know, or never 
expect to retire.  Placing couples who never expect to retire in the same group as those 





to stop working may not have given retirement as much thought and planning as the 
couples who expect to retire at the same time.  To see if the composition of the joint 
retirement category is problematic, the second measure of planned retirement year 
separates couples who do not know or never expect to retire from those with the same or 
adjacent retirement year. 
Many different approaches exist to measure retirement status, with most centered 
on an individual's self-declaration or the receipt of some sort of retirement benefit. 
Subjective measurements of retirement consider respondents retired if they declare 
themselves retired, and ask individuals what retirement means to them and if they think 
they are currently retired (Curl and Townsend 2008).  Objective measurements of 
retirement count individuals as retired if the respondent has accepted Social Security, 
pension benefits, or no longer works for pay (Curl and Townsend 2008). Each measure 
has its advantages and disadvantages. Subjective measures based on an individual's self-
definition have the strength of counting people who retire but work fewer hours. An 
advantage of objective measures is that social desirability bias is less of an issue, as some 
individuals may be retired but do not want to define themselves as such or are disabled 
and prefer to refer to themselves as retired rather than disabled.  
I use both subjective and objective measures of retirement. For the subjective 
measure, I define individuals as retired if they consider themselves either partially or 
completely retired when asked about their labor force status.  The HRS questions 
respondents about their retirement status a second time if individuals define their labor 
force status as partly or completely retired, asking: "At this time do you consider yourself 





only define respondents and their spouses as retired if they self-define as such in both 
questions.  For the objective measure, I define individuals as retired if they report 
receiving income from either Social Security retirement or a retirement pension.  For 
those who draw an income from Social Security, I only define the individual as retired if 
they are receiving retirement, widow, or spouse benefits.  Individuals are not counted as 
retired if they are receiving income from the Social Security disability program.  
All models include independent variables that account for demographic, family, 
economic, and health characteristics. In addition, I model retirement as a function of 
couple and household characteristics.     
Past and Current Experiences  
Research has long focused on how an individual’s economic resources impact the 
timing of retirement.  Total wealth is my primary variable of interest here, as it more fully 
captures what resources a person has at their disposal. Total wealth is a household level 
measure that represents the sum of all wealth components (e.g. stocks, bonds, certificates 
of deposits, real estate, etc.) minus any debts.  The RAND file imputes values when any 
wealth component is missing.  Three different types of imputation are used depending on 
whether the respondent gave a range of values, indicated that they own such an asset (e.g. 
bond or stock) but provided no value, or gave no information on whether or not they own 
such an asset (Chien et al. 2013).  Besides total wealth, I measure whether or not 
individuals have access to an occupational pension, and if it is a defined-benefit pension, 
defined-contribution pension, or both.  I also include a job history measure (i.e. total 
years in labor force) and current earnings, as current wages reflect the opportunity costs 





The responsibilities a person carries for their family can prevent them from 
adequately preparing for retirement, or at least make it much more difficult.  Some 
individuals nearing retirement possess childrearing responsibilities or care for elderly 
parents. Although an extensive analysis of caregiving is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, I include a measure for the number of living children of the respondent and 
spouse. 
A person's health status plays a major role in the retirement decision-making 
process. Individuals in poor health tend to retire early or enroll in SSDI, the federal 
government's disability program. Health problems are one of the most common reasons 
individuals decide to collect Social Security at age 62 instead of the full age of eligibility 
(Haveman et al. 2003; Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos 2004; McGarry 2004). I include 
the self-rated measure of health in the model, with answers ranging from poor to 
excellent.  Prior research has shown self-rated health measures to be accurate in 
forecasting important outcomes such as mortality (Idler and Benyamini 1997).  Variables 
for whether or not respondents have current and retiree health insurance are included as 
well. 
Demographic Characteristics 
I include several variables for individual demographic characteristics.  These 
measures are age, education, race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic African 
American, non-Hispanic other, and Hispanic), and birth cohort. Several studies have 
examined how the timing of retirement differs by race, but less research has looked at 








The number and type of spousal characteristics vary from chapter to chapter, but 
regression models usually include measures for spousal age or spousal age difference, 
health, retiree health insurance, and pension access.  To better understand how the 
distribution of economic resources within the household impacts retirement outcomes, 
variables for relative earnings, relative pension access, and relative retiree health 
insurance are included as well.  The relative resource variables for pension and retiree 
health insurance access measure show whether the husband, wife, or both partners 
possess these retirement benefits.  The relative earnings measure indicates how much 
each spouse contributes to total household earnings.  In addition, individual-level models 
in this dissertation include measures for spousal retirement expectations (in chapters 5 
and 7) and retirement status (chapter 7). 
Analysis Plan 
My research strategy has two parts: first, to examine the retirement expectations 
of dual earning couples; and second, to model the process of retirement for them. The 
first chapter will look at the expected probability of working full-time past age 65 of dual 
earning couples from four cohorts (1936-41, 1942-1947, 1948-1953, and 1954-1959) at 
each of their respective baseline interviews (1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010) when at least 
one of the respondents is between the ages of 51 and 56. Since men's and women's life 
course patterns often differ, I analyze the impact of spousal characteristics on an 






As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show, the distribution for the first outcome measure 
(expected probability of working full-time after age 65) has many more 0s and 100s than 
would be expected by a parametric distribution.  The reasons for many people’s 
responses being moved to the end points of the scale may stem from the uncertainty of 
individuals in estimating a probability.  Previous research has demonstrated that interval 
regression can successfully handle the censored nature of probability variables 
(Szinovacz, Martin, and Davey 2014).   This method accomplishes this by defining the 
outcome measure in terms of two variables representing the lower and upper limits of 
censoring (0 and 100 in this case). Alternative specification using OLS, logistic, and log-
linear regression were initially tried, but interval regression had the best fit in terms of the 
normality of the residuals.  Another benefit of this method is that regression coefficients 
can be interpreted in the same manner as unstandardized coefficients in OLS regression.  
Particular attention will be paid to how much husbands or wives influence each 
other’s retirement expectations the more attached women are to work and whether this 
has changed across cohorts.  Controlling for other individual characteristics, I expect that 
the retirement expectations of wives from dual earner couples will be less responsive to 
their marital partners’ retirement expectations the stronger their connection to work and 
the greater their market resources (e.g. income, retiree health insurance, eligibility for 
pension, etc.) relative to their husbands. Since women from younger cohorts like the early 
baby boomers (1948-53) and mid baby boomers (1954-1959) are more prone to have 
work lives and histories that make planning retirement more difficult than respondents 
born in the 1930s, I hypothesize that the women of the baby boom cohorts will be less 





 My investigation of retirement expectations extends into the second analysis 
(Chapter 6) which focuses on couples rather than individuals.  Here, the dependent 
variable distinguishes among three categories of couples: those in which husbands 
planned to retire year first, those in which wives planned to retire first, and those in which 
both spouses share the same retirement plans (either in the same year, in adjacent years, 
or both never plan to retire or do not know.  The analysis is cross-sectional and models 
the expectations of dual-earning couples from three cohorts at their baseline interviews. 
Such an approach would investigate to what degree couples’ retirement expectations are 
in sync with each other and whether the alignment of couples’ plans has changed across 
cohorts.   
The second part of study moves from retirement expectations to the actual 
transition to retirement.  It seeks to address how one’s spouse affects the timing of 
retirement and whether or not spousal factors have become more or less influential across 
cohorts. I hypothesize that a wife’s retirement transition, regardless of cohort, will be less 
influenced by her husband’s retirement timing the more attached she is to the labor force, 
while husband’s labor force withdrawal will be increasingly influenced by their wife the 
longer her work history and the greater her market resources. As with the other outcome 
measures, I expect the retirement timing of wives from later cohorts to be less influenced 
by their spouse’s retirement than older cohorts.  The analysis will include separate 
models for men and women, using cox proportional hazard methods to look at how 
spousal characteristics impact the risk of retirement for each cohort.  I trace the 
retirement transition for the HRS, war, and early boomer cohorts for four waves after 





51-56 to 59-64.  Event history methods have the advantage of being able to handle 
censored cases, which applies to individuals who drop out during the course of the study 
or have not retired by the end of the observation period. The use of a person record file 
means that each person receives one response for every wave that he or she participates 
in the study, thereby making it possible to follow individuals for varying lengths of time.  
Although I am unable to trace all of the cohorts past the traditional retirement age of 65, 
many workers begin their retirement transition prior to age 65.  As of the year 2000, more 
than 50% of workers chose to retire by age 62 (Ferreira and Santos 2013), meaning I will 
still pick up a substantial number of people who transition into retirement despite not 





Chapter 5. Individual Retirement Expectations at Baseline 
Broadly speaking, this dissertation focuses on how changes in women’s labor 
force activity may have altered the retirement dynamics of dual-earner couples. As noted 
previously, the retirement transition includes not only the actual withdrawal from work 
but also the planning process that takes place prior to entering this stage of the life 
course. This chapter focuses on retirement expectations and whether or not the influence 
of spousal characteristics has changed over time. Do wives’ retirement expectations 
become less driven by their husbands’ preferences and resources as their human and 
financial capital grows? And do wives’ increased economic resources mean that 
husbands increasingly take into account their wives’ preferences and resources when 
formulating their own retirement plans?  
The analysis in this chapter seeks to understand how women’s resources (e.g. 
education, earnings, pensions, etc.) impact the individual retirement expectations of 
husbands and wives. In addition, this chapter looks at whether or not husbands’ influence 
on their wives expectations has waned across cohorts as a result of wives’ obtaining more 
resources relative to their husbands. Recent trends show that baby boomer women are 
more likely to have advanced degrees, work full-time, receive employer-provided health 
insurance, and their own pension (Blau and Kahn 2007; Gale 1997; Winston and Barnes 
2007).  Higher levels of educational attainment and work hours have translated into 
higher earnings for baby boom women compared to earlier cohorts.  At the same time, 
the gender gap has not closed and men still often have greater resources relative to their 
spouse in terms of earnings, pension access and wealth, and employer-provided health 





retirement expectations by comparing four cohorts of dual-earner couples in their fifties 
between 1992 and 2010. 
Sample Selection and Description 
The sample for the analysis in this chapter consists of men and women from four 
birth cohorts (HRS, War Babies, Early Baby Boomers, and Mid-Baby Boomers) who are 
part of a dual-earning couple household when first interviewed in 1992, 1998, 2004, or 
2010 when at least one spouse is between the ages of 51 and 56 (N=6,344). As stated 
previously, a couple qualifies as a dual-earner household if both members are working for 
pay at the baseline interview, and do not self-identify as either partially or completely 
retired. Same-sex partner households and couples in which one spouse is younger than 45 
or older than 62 are removed (N=978).  Same-sex couples are not included in order to 
ensure that the sample remains balanced in terms of the number of husbands and wives in 
the sample.  Couples where one spouse is far away from or already reached prime 
retirement age are excluded because they are likely to have different responses to 
questions on retirement than middle-aged individuals, which is the predominant age 
group focused on here.  In addition, households where either partner is missing data for 
the main outcome measure or any of the independent variables are also excluded 
(N=226).  The one exception is the variable retiree health insurance; a separate category 
is created to denote if the individual is missing a response to this question in order to 
retain them in the sample (N=458).  The omission of individuals with missing data does 
result in a sample that contains a greater proportion of non-Hispanic whites, but the 





characteristics such as self-rated health, pension access, and education.  This amounts to a 
total sample of 5,140 husbands and wives across all cohorts.   
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics for husbands and wives in each birth cohort 
at their baseline interview. Husbands are older than wives in every cohort, but the age 
gap narrows from 2.6 years in the earliest cohort to 1.2 years in the latest cohort. The 
sample is majority non-Hispanic white, but the boomer cohorts are more diverse (roughly 
81% white in the mid boomer cohort compared to 88% white in the HRS cohort).  
Educational attainment has clearly increased, especially among women, with the 
percentage of wives with a bachelor’s degree or more doubling from 17.1% in the HRS 
cohort to 41.6% in the mid-baby boom cohort. For men, educational attainment increases 
noticeably between the HRS and war cohorts (24.5% vs. 41.0%) but declines thereafter. 
 [Insert Table 5.1 here] 
The sample in this analysis suggests that quality of life for baby boomers has 
improved in some respects but declined or stagnated in others areas relative to their 
predecessors. For all four cohorts, about 70 percent of the sample finds their jobs stressful 
but only around one-third state that their job is physically demanding. On average, 
earnings (in real terms) have risen across cohorts for both husbands and wives.  The total 
years in the labor force for both husbands and wives remains fairly steady between the 
HRS cohort and early boomer cohorts and then falls precipitously for the mid-baby 
boomer cohort3.  For wives, the average total numbers of years in the labor force is 
highest in the early baby boom cohort (27.2) and drops thereafter, with mid-baby boom 
cohort of women having the lowest mean numbers of years in the labor force (23.0).  
                                                 
3 Mid-baby boom individuals are more likely to have dates missing in their retrospective job history, 





Husbands in the HRS cohort have the highest average number of years in the labor force 
(35.1) and like the women the mid-baby boom cohort has the lowest (25.3).  A majority 
has some kind of health insurance, but coverage declined for husbands from around 72% 
in 1992 to 65% in 2010, while the percentage of wives with health benefits increased 
from about 45% in 1992 to 54% in 2010.  At least 85% of husbands and wives in all 
cohorts rate their health anywhere from good to excellent, but wives in the baby boom 
cohorts are more likely than the earlier two cohorts to report fair or poor health.  
  A look across birth cohorts reveals a plethora of economic change taking place 
among dual-earning couples.  The total number of years in the labor force may not have 
risen, but women generally display greater levels of labor force participation and 
attachment in the later cohorts. The percentage of women working full-time increases 
after the HRS cohort, and women’s earnings noticeably increases, although the earnings 
gap between men and women remains quite large across generations. Compensation for 
women has not only resulted in higher earnings but also greater levels of fringe benefits. 
Women from the baby boom cohorts are more likely to receive employer-provided health 
insurance and a defined-contribution pension from work than women born in the 1930s. 
The exceptions to the general rise in nonwage compensation are the provision of 
traditional defined benefit pensions and retiree health insurance, which declined for both 
men and women across generations but particularly for men.   
An investigation of how employee benefits are distributed within couples shows 
that husbands across cohorts are more likely to have retiree health insurance and a 
defined-benefit pension than their wives, although the gender gap becomes much smaller 





retiree health insurance dropped 11 percentage points (from 13% in the HRS cohort to 
2% in the mid-boomer cohort) while the percentage of couples with neither spouse 
having insurance rose substantially from around 26% in the HRS cohort to 58% in the 
mid-boomer cohort. The loss of insurance among husbands appears to primarily drive 
this trend.  On the other hand, the proportion of couples where both have a pension 
increased from approximately 40% to 44% between the HRS and mid baby boom 
cohorts.  Given the upward trend in defined-contribution pension availability, the overall 
decline in pension access seems to come mainly from a reduction in the proportion of 
people with a defined-benefit pension.  The last relative resource measure is spousal 
contribution to household earnings, which ignores passive income from sources such as 
dividends, rental income, or capital gains. This relative earnings measures shows that 
wives’ contribution to household earnings is consistently less than half but has risen 
slightly across cohorts, from about 37% to 41%.  
In line with previous research, women plan to stop working sooner than men in 
every single cohort and the difference between the two sexes is always fairly sizeable, 
although the husbands and wives of middle baby boomers do have the smallest difference 
in expectations.  The expected probability of working full-time after age 65 rises with 














Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following are my research questions and hypotheses for this chapter:  
How do wives’ and husbands’ retirement expectations change the more attached women 
are to work and the greater their economic resources are relative to their husbands?  
Hypothesis 1: The expected probability of working full time past age 65 for wives from 
dual earner couples becomes increasingly tied to wives’ own economic resources instead 
of their spouse’s retirement expectations, as women become more committed and 
attached to work and have greater relative economic resources compared to their 
husbands. For husbands, I hypothesize that their wives’ work attachment and relative 
economic resources will become an increasingly important determinant of husbands’ 
retirement expectations and decisions.  
To what extent have retirement expectations among husbands and wives of dual-earner 
couples changed across cohorts as a result of women’s rising labor force participation? 
Hypothesis 2: Husbands’ expected probability of working full time past age 65 
influences wives’ retirement expectations in later cohorts less than in earlier cohorts.  
Wives’ expected probability of working full time past age 65 influences husbands’ 
retirement expectations in later cohorts more than in earlier cohorts. 
Results 
 In this section, I first examine cohort differences in the bivariate relationships 
between retirement expectations (measured by the expected probability of working full-
time after 65) and the main independent variables, looking at individual and couple 
characteristics separately in Tables 5.2a and 5.2b respectively. Couple characteristics are 





retirement expectations vary when one spouse, both spouses, or neither spouse has 
pensions and retiree health insurance, as well as how retirement expectations vary 
depending on how much a person’s spouse contributes to overall household earnings. 
Bivariate Analysis 
The mean expected probability of working full-time after 65 for dual-earner 
couples varies considerably along generational, individual and household lines.  As 
discussed previously, mean expected probabilities of full time work after age 65 steadily 
rise across generations, indicating both men and women from later generations plan on 
delaying retirement longer than earlier generations.  Men in all generations, however, are 
consistently more likely than women to expect to work past age 65.  Moreover, a number 
of interesting patterns emerge across other demographic and economic characteristics. 
 [Insert Table 5.2a here] 
The bivariate results indicate that the desire to remain working after age 65 may 
stem from different motives, as one group of husbands who have higher than average 
work expectations are relatively advantaged while the other group is relatively 
disadvantaged. Husbands who are white or have at least a bachelor’s degree are more 
likely to work after 65 than black men and men with less than a bachelor’s degree. On the 
other hand, men who have no retiree health insurance or no pension plan are also more 
likely to plan to work after 65 (compared to men with retiree health insurance and men 
with either defined-benefit or defined-contribution pensions).  In addition, men who are 
in the bottom third of the earnings or wealth distributions usually have higher than 
average mean probabilities, as well as men who work part-time compared to full-time.  





without retiree health insurance or a pension disadvantaged, but the results suggest that 
some husbands may express an interest in working longer because they find their jobs 
rewarding, whereas others may feel they need to continue working out of necessity.   
Like men, some relatively advantaged women demonstrate an inclination to work 
longer, as wives in good to excellent health have higher work expectations than those 
with fair or poor health.  Across cohorts, women who work full-time have higher than 
average mean probabilities compared to part-time workers.  
Other bivariate relationships that show up in some cohorts but not all include 
number of living children, total years in the labor force, and pension status.  Excluding 
the early baby boom cohort, women with no children express a greater willingness to 
work longer.  Wives with less than 20 years spent in the labor force who are members of 
the HRS and war cohorts have slightly lower mean probabilities than women with more 
than 20 years in the labor force. For wives from the early and mid-baby boom cohorts, 
those with less than 20 years in the labor force have slightly higher mean probabilities of 
working after 65.   
 Upon examination of most demographic and economic variables, it becomes clear 
that the largest differences in mean expected probability of work after 65 tend to be 
between men and women.  When looking at work characteristics, differences between 
men and women in work expectations are especially large among people who work part-
time, have earnings in the bottom third, and have no pension. Those with retirement 
resources show smaller gender differences, suggesting that gender differences are greater 
among people with fewer economic resources and narrower for those with jobs that are 





smaller differences from men in work probabilities, as do men and women with employer 
provided retiree health insurance. 
 [Insert Table 5.2b here] 
Turning to couple characteristics, Table 5.2b shows the relationship between 
expectation to work after 65 and couple’s relative retiree health insurance, pension, and 
earnings resources.  There is no noticeable pattern for wives between the outcome 
measure and relative retiree health insurance.  The relationship between retiree health 
insurance and expectation to work varies by cohort for husbands, however, with men 
having a higher likelihood of working after 65 when they do not have retiree health 
insurance, including both households where neither spouse has retiree health insurance or 
only the wife’s job has retiree health insurance (households where either spouse is 
missing a value for the retiree health insurance variable also have higher mean 
probabilities of working after age 65). 
The results also show that expectation to work after 65 varies depending on the 
pension access in the household.  Regardless of wives’ pension access, husbands with no 
pension expect to work longer than men who have a pension. Across all cohorts, wives 
have higher mean probabilities in couple households where neither spouse has a 
retirement pension as well.  Both husbands and wives have lower if not the lowest 
average probability of working when both spouses have a pension.  
Finally, the results suggest that the relationship between one’s contribution to 
household earnings and retirement expectations differs for men and women.  Prior to 
baby boom cohorts, husbands who are the primary provider (i.e., they contribute a 





compared to those providing less than 50 percent.  In contrast, across all cohorts, wives 
who are the primary provider are somewhat less likely than other wives to work past age 
65, suggesting that these women may not be derive much satisfaction from their 
employment and plan to retire once they have the means to do so.    
Multivariate Analysis  
 Tables 5.3a and 5.3b address the degree to which individual and couple 
characteristics predict retirement expectations of husbands and wives across cohorts.  The 
results in Tables 5.3a and 5.3b present coefficients from interval regressions run 
separately by cohort for the expected probability of full-time work after 65 among 
husbands (Table 5.3a) and wives (Table 5.3b) in dual-earning couples.  The results 
generally show that retirement benefits and spousal expectation to work after 65 
influence a person’s retirement expectations, regardless of gender.   
 Consistent with the bivariate results, men who are black (as opposed to white) 
display a lower propensity for full-time work after 65 while those who are college 
educated have a higher likelihood of working after 65. An examination of spousal 
characteristics for husbands shows that spousal expected probability of work after 65 and 
pension resources are significantly associated with the outcome measure across cohorts. 
As expected, wives’ retirement expectations are positively associated with their 
expectations, meaning that a husband’s likelihood of working after 65 increase if their 
wife’s expectations also increase. Compared to respondents where both spouses have a 
pension, husbands who do not have a pension but their wife does are more likely to work 
after 65.  Husbands in households where neither spouse has a pension are also more 





[Insert Table 5.3a here] 
The effect of many factors remains relatively stable over time, but the effects of 
some variables change considerably across cohorts for husbands.  Full-time work is 
positively associated (significant at the 0.05 level for war babies) with working after 65 
for husbands in the first two cohorts and then becomes negative for early baby boom 
men, although the coefficient is not statistically significant.  The effect of total wealth is 
slightly positive for husbands in the HRS and war cohort and then becomes negatively 
and significantly related to work after 65 for the boomer cohorts.   
The right-hand side for Table 5.3a denotes any significant interaction between a 
given cohort (compared to the HRS cohort) and individual, spousal, or couple 
characteristics when all are grouped together in a pooled regression model. For example, 
the age*cohort interaction is significant in the model for husbands in the mid boomer 
cohort (marked by ‘---‘ because the interaction is negative), which means that the 
influence of age on an individual’s expectation to work after 65 is significantly more 
negative among mid-baby boom men compared with the HRS cohort men.  
Interestingly, the wealth*cohort interaction is significant and negative.  In the 
baby boom cohorts, greater levels of wealth is associated with a lower likelihood of 
husbands expecting to work after age 65, suggesting that wealth has a larger impact on 
retirement expectations in later cohorts.   Despite women deriving more resources from 
their jobs in later cohorts, wives’ expectation of working after 65 exerts less influence on 
husbands from the early and mid-baby boom cohort compared to men from the HRS 





retirement expectations on husbands’ personal retirement expectations is weaker (albeit 
still significant) in the later cohorts than in the earlier cohorts.   
Turning to the model for wives, working full-time is positively associated with 
work after 65.  Like their male counterparts, spousal retirement expectations and pension 
resources have a significant and consistent impact across cohorts.  Husbands’ intention to 
work after age 65 is positively associated with wives’ probability of working after 65. 
Compared to respondents where both spouses have a pension, wives are also more likely 
to work after 65 when neither spouse has a pension.      
 [Insert Table 5.3b here]   
 Similar to husbands, the effect of most coefficients does not change much across 
cohorts.  However, the number of living children appears to be more important for wives 
in the war and early baby boom cohort, but the direction of the relationship is not 
consistent. As with men, wealth seems to become more important over time, but the 
significant and negative association found among war and early baby boom women loses 
predictive power among mid-baby boomers.   
The interaction side of Table 5.3b reveals significant differences from earlier 
cohorts.  Greater wealth among wives from the early baby boom lowers the probability of 
expecting to work after 65 more than in the HRS cohort.  As with husbands, the strength 
of the effect of one’s spouse working after 65 on personal retirement expectations 
decreases in the boomer cohorts relative to wives from the HRS cohort.  Additional 
results from the pooled regression show early baby boom women are more likely to work 





Finally, compared to women in the HRS cohort, early and mid-boomer wives are less 
likely to work after 65 if neither spouse has a pension.  
In models not shown, I tested interactions of spousal retirement expectations and 
women’s economic indicators (e.g. earnings, work experience, relative pension status, 
etc.) to assess whether wives’ employment attachment and resources results in husbands’ 
retirement preferences holding less influence and wives’ retirement preferences mattering 
more within cohorts.  The interactions found little of interest or significance to support or 
contradict the hypotheses proposed in this chapter.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter has concentrated on dual-earning couples and the relative importance 
of women’s work characteristics on husbands’ and wives’ retirement expectations and 
how this has changed across cohorts.  The results show that both men and women in 
more recent cohorts expect to work longer than individuals from earlier cohorts when 
they were of similar age.  The mean expected probability of working full-time after age 
65 increased from roughly 28% for men and 19% for women in the HRS cohort to 40% 
and 32% respectively for members of the middle baby boom cohort. While the reasons 
for this upward trend are multifaceted, possible explanations include greater educational 
attainment, the decline of defined benefit pensions and retiree health insurance, and 
increased labor force participation of women.  This dissertation focuses primarily on 
what role women’s labor force activity plays in the retirement decision making of dual-
earning couples.   
Traditional models of retirement expectations view women’s decision-making as 





the state of their own health or financial preparedness (e.g. savings and pension access). 
The expansion of women’s participation in paid work as well as their resulting gains in 
wage and nonwage compensation provide reason to think that households in which both 
partners were committed to work would follow a different, less gendered model.  
Specifically, I expected that as women became more attached to their careers and 
accumulated more employment resources, they would be less influenced by their 
husbands’ employment resources and preferences and increasingly formulate retirement 
expectations that best serve their own self-interest, which for some involves working later 
and for others retiring earlier.  In turn, I expected wives would influence their husbands’ 
retirement expectations more the greater their economic resources. I also anticipated that 
this less gendered model would become more prevalent over time as new cohorts would 
have more women highly attached to the labor force, meaning that husbands would 
impact the retirement expectations of wives less in later cohorts than in earlier ones. 
The results provide mixed support for the expectations outlined in this chapter.  
For wives, husband’s work expectations still matter even when controlling for personal 
economic indicators.  None of the economic measures (e.g. education, work status, 
earnings, etc.) have a stronger effect in later cohorts either.  And tests of association 
involving spousal retirement expectations and women’s resources do not clearly indicate 
that husbands matter less or wives matter more when women work longer, earn more or 
possess pensions. But as expected, the influence of husbands’ declines across cohorts, as 
evidence from the pooled regression suggests that the impact of husbands’ retirement 






For husbands, wives’ retirement expectations, pension and retiree health 
insurance impact the retirement expectations of husbands even when controlling for 
personal economic indicators, but contrary to predictions, the influence of wives also 
appears to wane in later cohorts. Despite women from later cohorts being more 
committed to working past age 65 and having more economic resources, husbands’ 
retirement expectations become less connected to the status of their wives in later 
cohorts.  Thus, the results do confirm the declining influence of husbands on wives’ 
retirement expectations, but the results also show that wives have become less influential 
on the retirement expectations of husbands.  This suggests a growing similarity of the 
retirement process for husbands and wives in a way that loosens the ties that bind 
couples’ retirement expectations together.   
The decline in spousal influence may reflect earlier life course orientations that 
are more individualistic and see marriage as a stage in one’s own personal development 
(Cherlin 2004).  Compared to previous cohorts, many baby boomers, particularly women, 
place a stronger emphasis on establishing work ties.  As this group came of age amidst 
rapid economic restructuring, the path to stable employment was less linear than the past, 
and the education and work experience required to find job security often took longer.  
For many individuals, the need to make greater investments in education and 
employment meant marriage came much later in the life course.  With marriage no longer 
the focus of adult life, couples may increasingly formulate their retirement expectations 
separately as opposed to jointly because they were already accustomed to making 





 In sum, dual-earning couples do still influence each other, but the relative 
importance of one’s spouse on retirement expectations has declined for both men and 
women.  For women, evidence suggests that increased labor force attachment, as seen 
through higher earnings and greater proportions possessing pensions, plays an important 
role in the decline of their husband’s influence on retirement expectations. For men, the 
reasons are less clear and future research should explore their retirement expectations 
further.  Now that I have found that dual-earner spouses influence on each other has 
lessened across cohorts, the next chapter turns to joint and sequential retirement 
expectations and whether or not the declining impact of one’s spouse results in less 





Chapter 6. Couple Retirement Expectations at Baseline 
Whereas the previous chapter looked at retirement expectations for husbands and 
wives separately, this chapter explores the degree to which spouses synchronize their 
retirement plans.  Chapter 5 showed that spouses continue to influence each other’s 
retirement expectations, but it did not show the degree to which couples plan to retire 
together.  Why do some couples plan to retire together while others do not?  Are couples 
from later cohorts less likely to plan for joint retirement? Traditional models of 
retirement would assume that wives follow their husbands and retire jointly or before 
them, but women’s increased investment in paid employment challenges this assumption. 
With many women working more extensively over the life course, has joint retirement 
become less common now that the opportunity costs of exiting work have risen, 
especially for women?  
Couples may follow a more egalitarian path to retirement as a result of women’s 
rising attachment to work.  In this model, one would expect wives to base their retirement 
decisions more on the costs and benefits of still working and less on their husbands’ 
preferences and resources.  Although husbands may influence wives less in egalitarian 
marriages, such couples may still be inclined to plan for joint retirement, albeit for 
different reasons than those stated in traditional models of retirement.  Couples in which 
both partners have made significant investments in their careers may be subject to similar 
economic forces and institutional retirement schedules, making them indirectly more 
likely to plan for joint retirement.  The narrowing of gender differences in terms of 
economic resources may also mean that partners are more likely to both possess 





And since women’s resources have risen over time, one would expect joint retirement to 
be more common among couples from later cohorts than earlier cohorts. Conversely, 
couples in which both spouses display similar commitments to work may find themselves 
unable to retire jointly without one or both members sacrificing some of the benefits they 
have accrued from employment.  
In sum, women’s changing roles and resources may lead to conflicting 
expectations with regards to joint retirement.  On the one hand, as women become more 
invested in their careers, they may be less likely to simply follow their husbands into 
retirement.  On the other hand, the narrowing of the gender gap in economic resources 
may mean joint retirement is on the rise rather than the decline. The hypotheses below 
reflect this tension.   
To determine the degree to which spousal retirement plans are synchronized, we 
need to incorporate the retirement plans of each spouse.  Luckily, the HRS gathers this 
information when it asks all workers about the year in which they plan to retire.  As 
discussed previously, I exclude the Pre-War Baby cohort (but include War Babies, Early 
Baby Boomers, and Mid-Baby Boomers) from the analysis in this chapter because the 
wording for this question changed after the first wave of the HRS in 1992, possibly 





                                                 
4 Respondents across all waves are asked “Do you plan to stop working altogether or work fewer hours at a 
particular date or age, have you not given it much thought, or what”. From waves 3 onward, respondents 
are asked at what age/year they think they will stop working if they say they haven’t given it (retirement) 
much thought or have no current plans.  In wave one, however, those who do not list an age in which they 





Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following are my research questions and hypotheses for this chapter: 
How much does women’s rising employment attachment and economic resources make 
them want to retire at the same time as their husband or not? 
Hypothesis 3: Wives will be less likely to retire before their husbands or have the same 
plans as their work attachment and relative economic resources increase. Couples will 
retire jointly (or have the same plans) when they both have the retirement resources to do 
so or have similar economic profiles. 
Has the synchronicity of retirement plans for couples become more or less common 
across cohorts? 
Hypothesis 4: Couples in later cohorts will be more likely to synchronize their retirement 
than couples in earlier cohorts. 
Results 
This section starts with a descriptive summary of joint and sequential retirement 
expectations. Afterwards, I look at the bivariate relationship between spousal retirement 
order and each individual and couple-level covariate.  I then present the results of the 
multivariate models for couple retirement expectations, beginning first with an analysis 
of couple retirement expectations when I define the outcome as one of three categories: 
wife retires first, husband retires first, or couple has same retirement expectations, and 
then breaking the last category into two, separating out the couples with no plans to retire 





A Descriptive Overview of Joint and Sequential Retirement Expectations 
Table 6.1 shows very little change over time in the prevalence of joint and 
sequential retirement.  Across all cohorts, about one-third of couples expect the husband 
to retire first; two-fifths expect the wife to retire first, and about one-fourth have the same 
retirement plans (i.e. spouses plan to retire within one year of each other, both do not 
know, or both never plan to retire).  Further scrutiny into the “same plan category” shows 
that about one-fifth of the entire couple sample contains households where both spouses 
expect to never retire and around seven percent where they intend to retire at the same 
time.  These retirement expectation patterns remain very consistent across cohorts.   
A breakdown of retirement timing for couples who plan to retire sequentially (i.e. 
husbands or wives who plan to retire first) reveals that most couples fall into this 
category because their spouse never plans to retire.  Wives are less likely to  never retire 
than husbands, with around 64 percent of husbands who expect to retire first having a 
wife with no plans to retire but 75 percent of wives who plan to retire first having a 
husband who never or does not know if they will ever retire.  When looking at couples 
where both spouses list a planned retirement year, about 20 percent of husbands who plan 
to retire first expect to retire much earlier (four years or more) than their wives.  
Compared to husbands who plan to retire first, wives who expect to retire first are less 
likely to do so from a wide margin (12.2%).   
[Insert Table 6.1 here] 
 Almost three-quarters of couples who are coded as having the same retirement 
plans actually do not intend to exit the labor force at the same time; rather, neither spouse 





want to retire or do not think they will ever be able to retire. Among couples with the 
same retirement plans, only about 25 percent plan to retire either in the same year or in 
adjacent years, with couples slightly more likely to retire within adjacent years (13.9%) 
than in the same year (11.4%).  Only a small number of couples (1.5%) include both 
spouses who report not knowing when they expect to retire.  
The results in Table 6.2 show variation in couple retirement timing patterns by 
wives,’ husbands’, and couple characteristics for all cohorts combined.  The results 
generally suggest that spouses who have the same retirement plans are more affluent than 
other couples.  Couples who have the same retirement plans are more likely to be white, 
be in good to excellent health, and have higher earnings and wealth than those expecting 
sequential retirement.  On the other hand, couples who expect to retire jointly are not 
more likely to have pension or retiree health insurance than couples with sequential plans. 
Spouses are most likely to both have a pension among couples in which the husband 
plans to retire first.  Moreover, neither spouse having retiree health insurance is more 
prevalent among couples with joint plans than any with sequential plans.  
 [Insert Table 6.2 here] 
 Women in households where the wife expects to retire first are more likely to be 
in a precarious situation than couples with joint plans.  Among such couples, wives are 
more likely to have less than a college education, be in fair or poor health, and not 
possess employer health insurance.  Neither spouse possessing a pension is also more 
common among couples expecting the wife to retire first than the other two outcome 





 Couples who expect the husband to retire first also tend to be in a less secure 
position, although for different reasons than couples in which wives plan to retire first.  
Household in which the husbands intends to retire first have lower average earnings and 
wealth than other couples.  Conversely, spouses possessing pension resources is more 
likely among households where the husband plans to retire first than among couples with 
joint or other sequential plans.   
Modeling Couple Retirement Expectations 
Table 6.3 shows odds ratios from a multinomial logistic regression model 
predicting couple retirement plans for the pooled sample of cohorts, comparing the odds 
of sequential (i.e. either husbands or wives retiring first) versus joint retirement 
expectations (i.e. couples having the same retirement expectations).  The pooled 
multinomial logistic regression models indicate few cohort differences in couple 
retirement timing expectations.  Members of later cohorts are less likely than the war 
baby cohort to plan to retire jointly, but these cohort differences are only marginally 
significant at best.  A look at Figure 6.1 confirms this, showing a five-point decline from 
35.4 to 30.3 for the later cohorts in the probability of the husbands retiring first, and a 4.3 
point increase in couples with the same plans from 24.2 to 28.5.  The likelihood of the 
wife retiring first increased from 40.4 in the war cohort to 41.2 in the mid-baby boom 
cohort.  
[Insert Figure 6.1 here] 
Twice as many predictors significantly predict the likelihood of husbands retiring 
first than the chances of wives retiring first.  The wife characteristics that are significant 





College educated wives are more likely to have joint retirement plans, but being non-
Hispanic black or other (compared to non-Hispanic white wives) increase the odds of 
some type of sequential retirement.  Increases in wives’ work experience are also 
associated with a greater likelihood of husbands retiring first.     
[Insert Table 6.3 here] 
A look at husbands’ characteristics suggests that they may have greater influence 
the couple’s retirement timing patterns than do wives’ characteristics. Husbands’ 
earnings and total number of years in the labor force is negatively associated with joint 
retirement.  Older husbands of each cohort (i.e. closer to age 56 than 51) are more likely 
to expect to retire jointly, but age difference (measured as husband age minus wife age) 
increases the odds (0.12 times more likely for each one-unit increase in age difference) of 
husbands retiring first.  This means the older husbands are in relation to their wives, the 
more likely they are to retire first instead of have the same plans as their spouse.  The 
only other statistically significant couple characteristic is relative pension status.  Couples 
in which only the wife has a pension have lower odds of husbands expecting to retire first 
by 48 percent. At the same time, women are not more likely to retire earlier when they 
are the only person in the family with a pension.   
Turning to the factors associated with wives retiring first, wives are more likely to 
retire first (as opposed to having the same plans as their husband) if the wife is non-
Hispanic black and the husband is college educated.  On the other hand, households with 
college educated wives are less likely to expect wives to retire first. As expected, husband 
age is negatively associated with wives retiring first.  An examination of couple 





The multinomial model in Table 6.3 uses “same retirement plans” as the reference 
category, which includes couples with joint retirement plans and no plans. To see 
whether couples where both spouses never plan to retire (or do not know) are different 
from couples where both partners expect to retire within a year of each other, Table 6.4 
separates these two measures by using a four category outcome measure to isolate the 
joint planners from everyone else, thereby making all comparison against both spouses 
planning to retire in the same or adjacent years. The left hand column in Table 6.4 looks 
at the association between individual and couple-level covariates and the odds of 
husbands retiring first as opposed to couples expecting to retire within a calendar year of 
each other. Non-Hispanic black wives, husbands’ earnings, and husbands’ age all have a 
negative impact on husbands retiring first relative to retiring at the same time. Wives’ 
education and work experience are positively associated with husbands expecting to 
retire first, thereby providing support for the hypothesis that wives work longer than 
husbands as their employment attachment increases. Compared to non-Hispanic whites, 
non-Hispanic black husbands are more than 5.5 times as likely to retire before their wives 
as opposed to the same time. As expected, the relationship between age difference and 
husbands retiring first is positive, with each additional year that a husband is older than 
their wife increasing the odds of husbands retiring first by 0.13, or 13 percent.  In terms 
of retirement benefits, husbands are more likely to retire first if they are the only person 
in the household whose job provides retiree health insurance (1.4 times more likely than 
couples where both spouses have retiree health insurance) or a pension (.8 times more 





The middle column in Table 6.4 shows that very little predicts women retiring 
first versus jointly with their husbands.  A few marginal associations can be found, but 
the only significant coefficient suggests that when neither spouse has a pension 
(compared to couples where both have pensions), wives are significantly more likely to 
retire first rather than jointly.  
[Insert Table 6.4 here] 
The right hand column in Table 6.4 looks at the odds of husbands and wives both 
never expecting to retire (or both do not know) versus expecting to retire at the same 
time.  Such a contrast compares couples who think they will never want or have the 
means to retire to those who have more concrete plans. Couples with black wives are 0.8 
times less likely to never plan to retire, while couples with black husbands are 5.9 times 
as likely as couples with white husbands to never plan to retire.  Compared to households 
in which both spouses have a pension, couples in which only one or neither spouse has a 
pension are significantly more likely to never expect to retire.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine the degree to which spouses expect to synchronize their 
retirement.  Results suggest that the majority of couples do not share similar retirement 
expectations, with only about one-quarter of dual-earner couples having similar 
retirement expectations.  Among those with similar retirement expectations, the majority 
plan to never retire.  Indeed, one of the major findings of this analysis is the substantial 
portion of individuals who expect to never exit the labor force, echoing findings from 





The reasons for why so many people think they will never retire could stem from 
a concern about being unprepared for retirement or be due to not yet having thought 
seriously about retirement.  The results in this chapter indicate that unless both spouses 
have a pension, couples are more likely to feel they can never retire instead of retire 
together.  Individuals may be thinking about their pension access when answering the 
question on planned retirement year and think that the absence of a pension for one or 
both spouses means they will not have a financial foundation sturdy enough to allow 
them to exit the labor force.  The results presented in this chapter can only provide 
indirect support for such an explanation, as the possibility remains that people may never 
expect to retire not out of a sense of desperation or pessimism but out of a desire to 
remain at work because they derive pleasure and meaning from their job.  Some prior 
research suggests that money is not always the driving factor, as many people nearing 
retirement have expressed a desire to remain working in some capacity for the continued 
mental stimulation (Lynch 2005).  Regardless of the underlying motive for never 
planning to retire, they constitute the majority of dual-earning couples with the same 
retirement expectations. 
 As in the preceding chapter, I focus on the impact of women’s employment 
resources on couple retirement plans.  With wives having more to lose now that they 
derive more resources from work, I predicted their retirement expectations would be 
more distinct and less influenced by their husbands.  This chapter also examines whether 
women’s rising employment resources change the way couples look toward retirement, 
with a particular emphasis on how much women's rising labor force attachment makes 





would work longer than their husbands as their work attachment and financial resources 
increase, following them into retirement at a later date.  The justification behind this 
hypothesis is that women are no longer dependent on their husband for retirement due to 
the gender revolution and the subsequent increase in their economic well-being. And to 
answer the question of how husbands and wives increase or decrease the likelihood of 
joint or sequential retirement, I include relative resource measures for earnings, retiree 
health insurance, and pensions to help us think about the relative timing of spouses.   
The findings from the models that classify couple retirement expectations into 
three categories (husband first, wife first, or the same plans) provides little support for my 
hypotheses.  However, the second set of models that classify couple retirement 
expectations into four categories (husband first, wife first, same time, or both never 
expect to retire) indicate that when wives have more human capital (i.e. education and 
work experience), husbands are more likely to retire first.  The second set of models also 
exposes some key differences between couples with joint plans from those with no plans 
(i.e. never expect to retire) that the “same expectations” category had concealed.  In 
particular, the four-category model provides support for the idea that couples retire 
together when they have the resources to do so, as couples are more likely to expect to 
retire sequentially when only one spouse has a pension, meaning they are more likely to 
jointly retire when both partners have a pension.      
In looking across cohorts, we see little difference in expected order of spousal 
retirement.  The reason for the lack of differences may be that I do not have enough 
cohorts in order to make adequate comparisons.  Due to differences in the question 





HRS cohort (1936-1941). The previous chapter appeared to show that the war cohort 
(1942-1947) was often more similar to the boomer cohorts (1948-1959) than the HRS 
cohort, and it is plausible that one would need to look at individuals who were born 
before the 1930s before finding noticeable differences.  And a further possibility may be 
that we need to examine even later cohorts before we observe change.   
The model that separates couples who never plan to retire (or do not know) from 
couples who expect to retire within one calendar year of each other reveal a number of 
similarities.  Significant associations are found in both models for wives’ race, education, 
husbands’ earnings, husbands’ education, and age difference between spouses.  The 
majority of these factors relate to labor force attachment, indicating that individual work 
resources drive spousal retirement order.  Besides personal human capital, husbands’ age 
difference remains an important determinant of retirement synchronicity among dual-
earner couples, with increases in husband age difference raising the likelihood of 
husbands retiring first in both models.  
There are some similarities between the two models of spousal retirement order, 
but the model that separates couples who plan to retire within one year of each other from 
those who both never plan to retire reveals that these two types of couples are not 
identical. For example, the three category model of couples retirement plans shows that 
wives with a college education are less likely to retire first than have the same plans as 
their spouse.  A separation of those never planning to retire from those with the same date 
shows that wives who are college educated are only significantly more likely to be a part 
of a couple household where both plan to never retire.  Most importantly, the four 





whereas the three category models obscures this association. The parsing of the two joint 
retirement outcomes reveals some similarities, but some notable differences show that 
couples with the same retirement date diverge at times from those who never expect to 
retire. 
Overall, the results in this chapter show that expected spousal retirement order 
depends on race and ethnicity, economic resources, and age. Many of these factors were 
also found to be important in the first chapter.  The likelihood of each type of retirement 
order (wives first, husbands first, or same plans) has changed only slightly for individuals 
born in the 1940s versus the 1950s, but the effects of certain explanatory variables do 
sometimes differ across cohorts. Still, two different model specifications show a core 
group of measures that are significantly associated with spousal retirement order, namely 
factors capturing race and ethnicity, education, earnings, age, and relative pension status. 
These measures largely reflect the degree to which a person or household are invested in 
work and prepared for retirement.  Furthermore, the results from this chapter do provide 
some evidence for the notion that husbands and wives will retire together when they both 
have the resources to do so.  In the next chapter, I will follow individuals over time to see 






Chapter 7. Retirement Timing of Couples 
The past two chapters have looked at the extent to which husbands and wives 
influence and synchronize with each other’s retirement expectations. The current chapter 
moves beyond the baseline interview and follows couples for eight years to examine the 
degree to which they influence each other’s actual transition to retirement.  Many 
individuals will have not retired by the end of the eight year observation period, as most 
will be between the ages of 59 to 64, but a sufficient proportion do exit the labor force 
during this time to allow for study, as many retire (either partially or completely) or begin 
collecting a pension or Social Security before the traditional retirement age of 65.  As 
with previous chapters, the focus remains on cohort changes in the impact of wives’ 
employment resources on couple retirement patterns.   
Sample and Missing Data 
In order to follow everyone for equal time durations, the sample for the analysis 
in this chapter only consists of men and women from the first three birth cohorts (HRS, 
War Babies, and Early Baby Boomers) who are part of a dual-earning couple household 
at first interview.  The analysis in this chapter does not include individuals from the mid-
baby boom cohort because they are first observed in the survey in 2010 and can only be 
followed for one wave after their baseline interview.  Before handling any missing data, 
the longitudinal sample contained a total of 4,146 subjects and 15,032 person records.  
Sample attrition and household breakup account for the vast majority of missing data in 
this analysis. In total, the sample was reduced by 8.3% (N=344) for loss due to follow up 
or household breakup as a result of divorce or separation. Since event history models 





dropped than subjects.  Roughly 19.6% of person-year records were dropped due to 
attrition or couple dissolution resulting in a total 12,079 person-year records. In addition, 
32 subjects and 807 person-year records were dropped due to non-response to many 
explanatory variables.  Those identifying as non-Hispanic other were also removed 
(N=83) because their sample size was not large enough to generate accurate parameter 
estimates for individual cohort models. 
To avoid further sample reductions due to nonresponse on key independent 
variables, I imputed the values of dichotomous variables if they were sandwiched 
between two existing and identical values. For example, if a person reported fair or poor 
health (=1) in waves two and four but were missing for wave three, I would impute a 
value of 1 for wave three.  Gaps in data were not imputed if the values in the preceding 
and successive waves were not identical (i.e. both 0 or 1).  Imputation was also carried 
out for two continuous variables (personal and spousal work expectation after age 65).  In 
this case, I used the most recent value the person reported. For example, if a person 
reported an expected probability of 40 for working past age 65 in wave two but were 
missing data for wave 3 and 4, I inserted a value of 40 for that person in wave three and 
wave four. 
Tables A7.1a and A7.1b in the appendix show the results of both imputed and 
non-imputed pooled regressions.  This sensitivity check shows that the results do not 
substantially vary between imputed and non-imputed models. This results in a final 
sample of 3,687 subjects and 11,658 person records.  
Since what exactly constitutes retirement is still debated, I utilize two separate 





partially or completely retired in both the labor force status question (RWLBRF) and the 
retirement status question (RWSAYRET) of the HRS.  The second definition classifies 
people as retired if they report collecting individual income from either Social Security 
retirement (RWISRET) or a retirement pension (RWPENINC).  Individuals who receive 
Social Security disability are not included in this definition5. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following are my research questions and hypotheses for this chapter:  
How do women’s’ rising attachment to paid work and economic resources impact 
retirement timing in dual earner couples?  
Hypothesis 1: As women become more attached to the labor force and accumulate 
greater employment resources, 1) their retirement timing will increasingly reflect their 
own attributes rather than their spouse’s retirement status, and 2) For husbands, I 
hypothesize that their retirement timing becomes more connected to their wives’ 
retirement status as their wives’ work attachment and relative economic resources 
increase.     
To what extent has retirement timing among husbands and wives of dual-earner couples 
changed across cohorts as a result of women’s rising labor force participation? 
Hypothesis 2: Husbands retirement timing influence wives retirement timing in later 
cohorts less than in earlier cohorts, while wives retirement timing influence husbands 
retirement timing in later cohort more than in earlier cohorts. 
 
 
                                                 
5 No cases needed to be dropped from the sample, as the RAND HRS variable RWISRET automatically 







In this section I begin with an analysis of the cumulative hazard of retirement for 
husbands and wives by cohort without any other control variables for both definitions of 
retirement.  I follow this with a discussion of the bivariate relationship between 
experiencing retirement and a few key economic characteristics (e.g. earnings, pension 
status, wealth, etc.). I then turn to multivariate cox regression models for the first 
definition of retirement, which looks at the hazard of defining oneself as partially or 
completely retired, separately for husbands and wives by cohort.  The final set of cox 
regression models are in the same format as the first multivariate models but instead 
show the hazard of retirement as defined by collecting a pension or Social Security 
retirement benefits. 
Descriptive Analysis of the Retirement Transition 
 Using the life table method, Figures 7.1 and 7.2 plot the cumulative hazard of 
retirement by sex and cohort for both measures of retirement. The curves have the same 
shape in both definitions, with the hazard of retirement slowly rising in the second and 
third wave after baseline (when cohorts are ages 53-58 and 55-60) and then dramatically 
increasing in the fourth wave (when cohorts are 57-62), but a number of differences 
emerge between the two definitions. First, for most cohorts of husbands and wives, the 
chances of collecting a pension or Social Security by the third or fourth wave after 
baseline are lower than self-identifying as retired. For example, the cumulative hazard of 
collecting a pension for early baby boom men is about 25 percent by the fourth wave but 





cumulative hazard is equally stark for early baby boom wives, as they are roughly 30 
percent more likely to self-identify as retired than collect Social Security or a pension.   
In general, the probability of collecting a retirement pension is much lower in the 
third or fourth wave for the war and early baby boom cohorts than for the HRS (Pre-war 
Babies) cohort.  For the HRS cohort, about half of men are likely to retire by the 4th 
wave, regardless of definition.  Women of the HRS cohort have a lower likelihood of 
retiring than men, with around one third collecting a retirement pension by the 4th wave.  
The lower probability among the later cohorts of collecting a pension may reflect the 
decline in defined-benefit pensions and higher penalties for starting Social Security 
payments at age 62.   
[Insert Figures 7.1 and 7.2 here] 
The chances of experiencing retirement may be lower across all cohorts for 
women because they were not as likely as men to receive any employer-sponsored 
pension throughout the latter half of the 20th century (Even and Macpherson 1994; 
Munnell and Perun 2006).  Wives consistently display a lower risk of retiring by the 
fourth wave after baseline in both definitions.   The differences between women across 
cohorts are also smaller compared to husbands, especially when using the pension 
definition.  By the fourth wave after baseline, the chances of husbands from the HRS 
cohort collecting a pension are greater than early baby boom men by nearly thirty 
percentage points, while the cross-cohort difference for women is only half as great 
(about 15 percentage points). 
 Individuals in this study may be less likely to collect a pension than self-identify 





across cohorts.  One of the most important similarities between the two definitions is the 
noticeable cohort differences which begin to emerge by the third wave after baseline. By 
the fourth wave it becomes readily apparent that later cohorts are slower to retire. 
Overall, both husbands and wives from the early baby boom are less likely to retire than 
their pre-war baby counterparts. 
 The general trends by cohort and sex do vary by individual and couple 
characteristics. In both definitions of retirement, husbands are always more likely than 
wives to have retired by the fourth wave, but this gender difference has shrunk across 
cohorts as the chances of either spouse retiring has declined.  The narrowing of the 
gender gap for retirement timing may in part be due to changes in life expectancy that 
have resulted in smaller differences by sex (Glei and Horiuchi 2007; Pampel 2002).   As 
seen in Table 7.1a, men of the HRS cohort are most likely to self-identify as retired by 
the fourth wave after baseline if they have a defined-benefit pension (54.5%), are part of 
a couple household in which they possess retiree health insurance (53.9% when only their 
job has retiree health insurance and 51.7% when spouse’s job has insurance), and are in 
the top third in net worth (54.9%).   
The relationship between retirement timing and defined-benefit pension status, 
retiree health insurance, and wealth for men who belong to the war cohort is roughly 
similar to their HRS cohort counterparts, with men who have retirement benefits and 
greater wealth being more likely to retire.  The same economic characteristics (pension 
status, retiree health insurance, and wealth) seem to exert an influence on retirement for 
early baby boom men. Unlike previous cohorts, men with just a defined-contribution 





pension (32.8%). Like earlier cohorts, husbands who have retiree health insurance alone 
or in conjunction with their spouse are most likely to retire (33.6% and 35.1%), but the 
difference from other retiree health insurance categories is not as great. There is also a 
small wealth gradient for the early baby boom, as husbands in the top third are more 
likely to retire (34.7%) and those in the bottom third being least likely (28.9%).  In 
addition, there is a negative relationship between earnings and retirement, with husbands 
from the bottom third of the earnings distribution having the greatest hazard of retirement 
(38.4%) and those from the top third the lowest (29.3%).  The opposite effects of 
earnings and wealth suggest some may retire early out of need whereas some may retire 
out of want.   
[Insert Table 7.1a here] 
Like HRS cohort men, women of the HRS cohort are also more likely to retire if 
they are in the top third in terms of wealth (43.4%).  This trend holds across cohorts for 
women.  On the other hand, having a defined-benefit pension does not appear to greatly 
increase the risk of retirement, as wives with no pension are about as or more likely to 
retire.  When looking at retiree health insurance wives from the war and early baby boom 
cohort are most likely to retire when both they and their spouse have such employer-
sponsored insurance. 
The relationship between collecting a pension or Social Security and key 
economic characteristics are fairly similar to those found from the self-identification 
definition.  As stated previously, the motives for retiring can vary substantially from 
person to person, and relatively disadvantaged and advantaged people may decide to 





7.1a suggest the men who retire early are more a mix of people from across the 
socioeconomic spectrum, whereas women who retire early appear to be more affluent.   
Husbands consistently have a higher risk of entering retirement across cohorts if 
their earnings are in the bottom third and they have no pension. For example, 54.9 
percent of HRS men and 25 percent of early baby boom men with no pension retire by 
the end of the fourth wave compared with 31.5 and 3.4 percent of respective husbands 
with a defined-contribution plan.  This supports the pattern of low-income men with few 
resources collecting Social Security early at age 62.  At the same time, the chances of 
entering retirement using the second definition are slightly higher for men in the war and 
early baby boom cohort that have at least a bachelor’s degree and are part of a couple 
household in which both spouses have retiree health insurance.  This suggests that 
husbands closer to the bottom or top of the social hierarchy may be more likely to retire 
early than those in the middle.  And like the self-identification definition, there is a 
positive relationship between wealth and collecting a retirement pension.  
[Insert Table 7.1b here] 
The wives who collect a pension or Social Security tend to have greater than 
average resources.  Women who have a college education are more likely to enter 
retirement, although differences in retirement patterns across varying levels of education 
are fairly narrow. While there is no earnings gradient, women in the war and early baby 
boom cohorts are more likely to enter retirement if they are part of a couple household in 
which both spouses have retiree health insurance. Across cohorts, wealthier women and 





Multivariate Modeling of Time to Retirement 
 The results in Tables 7.2a and 7.2b show the relationship between individual and 
couple characteristics and the timing of retirement for husbands and wives in each cohort. 
Here, a person is considered retired (either partially or completely) if they self-identify as 
such.  With the exceptions of race and ethnicity, number of children, and education, all 
covariates are lagged one wave and can change over time as an individual’s life 
circumstances change.  The most consistent individual-level predictors for men across 
cohorts are age and retirement expectations. As expected, the risk of retirement is higher 
for older members of each cohort and increases as people become older across waves. On 
the other hand, people who expected to work after age 65 are less likely to have retired. 
There are also statistically significant differences in employment status and self-rated 
health but not in all three cohorts. Compared to husbands working part-time, men who 
work full-time are less likely to retire by the next wave for the HRS and war cohorts 
(0.32 and 0.60 times less likely). Compared to men in good to excellent health, those in 
fair or poor health are more likely to retire in all three cohorts, but this relationship is 
only significant in the early baby boom cohort (0.76 times more likely). 
 [Insert Table 7.2a here] 
 Many spousal and couple characteristics influence the risk of husbands retiring, 
but the strength of these relationships usually does not remain constant across cohorts. 
Having a retired wife increases the likelihood of retirement for husbands in the HRS and 
war cohort (odds are 21% and 16% higher respectively), but the direction of the 
coefficient becomes negative and is statistically insignificant for early baby boom men 





risk of retirement as well, but not for men in the early cohort.  The odds of retiring for 
husbands are 80% higher in the war cohort and 21% lower in the early baby boom cohort 
when their wives have a defined-benefit pension.  The only consistent predictors across 
cohorts are wife employer health insurance, which is associated with a higher risk of 
retirement, and neither spouses having retiree health insurance, which is associated with a 
lower risk of retirement compared to couples where both have retiree health insurance.       
 The right side of Table 7.2a investigates to what degree the strength and 
magnitude of each covariate has changed across cohorts.  The results reveal that the 
relationship between retirement and many variables depend on cohort membership.  
Compared to the HRS cohort, husbands in the war cohort who find their job stressful are 
less likely to retire. They are also less likely to retire as the number of children, earnings, 
and total years in the labor force increase (compared to pre-war babies). Having a 
defined-contribution pension is significantly more positive in later cohorts, but the overall 
effect on retirement is still negative for early baby boom men.  
Husbands from the early baby boom cohort are less likely to retire compared to 
men in the HRS cohort if they find their job stressful or physically demanding, or have 
employer health insurance.  They are more likely to retire if they are unemployed or out 
of the labor force (other work status), have a defined-contribution pension, or are in poor 
to fair health (compared to good to excellent health). Interestingly, the effect of net worth 
significantly changes from positive for men of the HRS cohort to negative for the early 
baby boom cohort, indicating that wealth may be a sign of increased attachment to the 





 In terms of couple characteristics besides wealth, the cohort interactions provide 
mixed support for the hypothesis that wives influence husbands’ retirement timing more 
in later cohorts than in earlier ones.  The effect of only wives’ jobs having retiree health 
insurance becomes more negative for men of the war cohort.  Having a wife with a 
defined-benefit pension decreases the likelihood of retiring for men of the early baby 
boom cohort and having a wife with a defined-contribution pension increases the chances 
of retiring. While such associations suggest that husbands have become more responsive 
to the needs and resources of their wives across cohorts, there are no significant 
interactions between cohort membership and spousal retirement status or spousal 
retirement expectations. The lack of a significant trend over time for these two covariates 
does not support the hypothesis that wives’ retirement timing influences husbands’ 
retirement timing in later cohorts more than in earlier cohorts. So while a number of 
cohort interactions do indicate that wives have become more important to the retirement 
decisions of husbands, some cohort interactions that were expected to show a significant 
trend over time did not have a meaningful impact.  
 Next, I examine wives’ time to self-identified retirement in Table 7.2b.  As with 
the models for husbands, significant positive relationships are found across cohorts 
between retirement and age and health.  Wives with at least a college education are only 
significantly more likely to retire as opposed to those with less than a high school degree 
in the early baby boom cohort (about 53% more likely).  Compared to women working 
part-time, those engaged in full-time employment are less likely to retire, but like 





expected probability of working past age 65 is associated with a lower risk of retiring (1-
2% lower for each percentage point increase in probability of working after 65).   
 [Insert Table 7.2b here] 
Unlike their male counterparts, wives timing of retirement appears to be more 
closely related to race/ethnicity and spousal retirement status and expectations.  
Compared to whites, non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics are less likely to retire in the 
HRS and war cohorts, although the coefficients for blacks are not statistically significant. 
By the early baby boom cohort, these two racial and ethnic groups are more likely to 
retire than non-Hispanic whites, but only significantly so for Hispanics.  Spousal 
retirement expectations is associated with retirement timing for all cohorts but the 
relationship goes from negative in the HRS and war cohort to positive in the early baby 
boom cohort.  The influence of husbands’ retirement status on wives’ retirement does not 
appear to decline across cohorts and may even have become stronger, as early baby boom 
women are nearly three times as likely to retire when their husband was retired compared 
to those whose husbands were not retired.  
Similar to the models for husbands, cohort status moderates the effect of many 
individual-level covariates on retirement timing for wives.  Wives from the war cohort 
are more likely to retire (compared to the HRS cohort) if they have an employment status 
other than full-time or part-time, or find their job physically demanding.  War cohort 
women are less likely to retire as their total years in the labor force or expectation to 
work after age 65 increases or if they are non-Hispanic black or have a defined-





As with the war cohort, early baby boom women are more likely to retire if they 
are unemployed or disabled (i.e. other employment status) or find their job physically 
demanding.  In addition, the hazard of retirement is higher among Hispanics, those with 
more children, full-time workers, and women with fair or poor health.  Compared to HRS 
cohort, higher earnings or having a defined-contribution pension is associated with a 
lower likelihood of retiring for early baby boom wives, thereby providing some evidence 
that women increasingly respond to personal economic indicators the more attached they 
are to work and the greater the resources they derive from such employment.  
The results from the cross-cohort interaction for wives largely confirm that 
husbands’ predictive power on their retirement timing has not waned, contrary to 
expectations and providing support for the notion that husbands drive retirement patterns 
within families (Denaeghel et al. 2011; Ho and Raymo 2009).  Compared to the HRS 
cohort, women from the early baby boom cohort are more likely to retire as their 
husbands’ expectation to work full-time after age 65 increases and if their spouse has a 
defined-contribution pension. Whether or not their husband is retired is still significantly 
associated with wives retiring in the early baby boom cohort, but the lack of any 
interaction at least indicates that husbands have not become more influential.   At the 
same time, husbands’ characteristics do not seem to be nearly as influential on wives’ 
time to retirement as wives’ characteristics were on husbands. Spousal age, retiree health 
insurance, and spousal pension status are not significantly associated with wives 
experiencing retirement as often as for husbands. 
I replicate the same cox models by cohort and sex for the second definition of 





eligibility and the availability of pensions by classifying individuals as retired if they start 
collecting Social Security or a retirement pension.  For husbands in both definitions, 
increases in age are significantly associated with retiring, while increases in the expected 
probability of working after 65 are associated with lower risks of retiring (about 1% with 
each one-unit increase in expectation to work). Spousal resources are important in both 
models as well, with the effect of having a wife with employer health insurance or a 
defined-benefit pension being relatively similar across definitions.  Those in a less stable 
situation are more likely to collect a pension or Social Security. Compared to husbands 
self-identifying as retired, men in the HRS and war cohort are more likely to collect a 
pension or Social Security if they have an “other” work status or are in fair to poor health 
but are not significantly more likely in the early baby boom cohort. Finally, the retiree 
health insurance measures are not as predictive of collecting a pension or Social Security 
compared to self-identifying as retired. 
[Insert Table 7.3a here] 
Overall, the cohort interactions for husbands are fairly similar between the two 
definitions of retirement, but there do appear to be some differences by race and 
ethnicity, work conditions, and one’s attachment to employment. Compared to the HRS 
cohort, men in later cohorts who are non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, or have a physically 
demanding job are more likely to collect a pension. Both war and early baby boom 
husbands are significantly less likely to collect a pension (compared to HRS cohort) if 
they were working full-time in the previous wave or have higher expectations of working 
past age 65, whereas there was no interaction between full-time status or retirement 





membership does not moderate the effect of having a defined-contribution pension on 
retiring as defined by Social Security or pension collection but does increase the risk of 
self-identifying as retired for husbands in later cohorts.  
The event history models for women on the hazard of collecting a pension or 
Social Security show fairly similar effects to the ones found in the self-identification 
models for many demographic, work, and retirement resource measures. As with 
husbands, wives are more likely to retire the older they become and are less likely to 
retire the higher their expected probability of working after age 65.  Still, a number of 
differences emerge after a careful look at both sets of results.  Unlike the self-
identification models, wives from the HRS cohort, but not the early baby boom, with at 
least a bachelor’s degree are more likely to retire compared to wives with less than a high 
school education.  In addition, working full-time and self-rated health do not significantly 
impact wives chances of collecting a pension or Social Security.  
[Insert Table 7.3b here] 
Overall, spousal and couple characteristics tend to exert a stronger influence on 
the timing of wives to receive a pension or Social Security than self-identifying as retired. 
The effects for spousal retirement status and expectations are not as consistently 
significant, but other spousal resources such as employer health insurance and earnings 
appear to be much stronger predictors on wives’ likelihood of collecting a retirement 
pension.   For example, wives are less likely in both definitions to retire when only the 
husband’s employment provides retiree insurance, but the coefficients are only 
significant for the HRS and war cohort in the models using pension or Social Security 





An examination of cohort interactions reveals that the effects of wives’ individual 
characteristics are not that different in the second models except for defined-contribution 
pension status.  Unlike the models using self-identification, war and early baby boom 
women that have a defined-contribution pension are not significantly less likely to retire 
(compared to pre-war babies). 
Wives in the war and early baby boom cohort are less likely to retire (compared to 
pre-war babies) in response to the characteristics of their spouse. Most notable is the 
interaction between cohort and spousal retirement status. Compared to the HRS cohort, 
war and early baby boom women are less likely to collect a pension or Social Security if 
their husband is already retired, thereby providing support for the hypothesis that 
husbands influence wives retirement timing less in the later cohorts.  A cohort interaction 
for spousal health is also only found in the model defining retirement as collecting Social 
Security or a pension.  Compared to the HRS cohort, early baby boom women are less 
likely to retire if their spouse is in fair or poor health (instead of good to excellent health).  
Taken together, women’s postponement of retirement when husbands are already retired 
or in bad health may indicate that women are more likely to assume the primary provider 
role when their husbands are unable to continue working.  
To examine whether the effect of spousal retirement status changes as wives’ 
employment attachment and resources increase, I ran interactions between husbands’ and 
wives’ retirement status and women’s economic indicators.  The models are not shown 
because the results were largely inconclusive and did not yield substantively meaningful 





against the hypothesis that wives’ increased resources leads to a less gendered retirement 
process for dual-earner couples. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has addressed how much wives’ and husbands’ retirement timing 
change as women become increasingly invested in work and whether women’s rising 
economic resources has led to significant differences in retirement patterns in later 
cohorts.  Using data from 11 waves of the Health and Retirement Study, I followed dual-
earning couples from three different birth cohorts for eight years each, when these 
individuals reached the ages of early retirement (age 59 to 64).  Overall, later cohorts of 
dual earner couples are working longer than earlier cohorts, in line with the retirement 
expectations they had when they first came under observation. However, the possibility 
remains that later cohorts will exit the labor force in similar proportions to their 
predecessors once they reach the normal retirement ages.    
The research questions in this chapter address how wives’ rising labor force 
activity impact retirement timing in dual earner couples and to what extent women’s 
greater engagement in paid work has altered retirement timing among dual-earner 
couples across cohorts.  The results provide mixed support for my hypotheses.  Personal 
work and retirement characteristics such as work conditions (i.e. job stressful or 
physically demanding), earnings, and pension status do appear to become increasingly 
important determinants of retirement timing for women in later cohorts.  However, tests 
of association involving spousal retirement status and women’s resources does not 
decisively support the notion that husbands matter less or wives matter more as women 





expectations and retirement status continue to influence wives in later cohorts and does 
not weaken as expected for both definitions of retirement.  Furthermore, husbands’ 
retirement timing does not appear to become more connected to their spouse’s retirement 
status when their wives possess more economic resources.  At the same time, it appears 
that many spousal characteristics have become less influential on wives retirement 
timing, such as age, health, and retiree health insurance, or the lack thereof.  And while 
wives from later cohorts are not less likely to self-identify as retired when their husbands 
are already retired, they are less likely to collect a retirement pension, perhaps 
representing a role reversal in which wives take over as provider when husbands can no 
longer work.    
Apart from addressing the effect of women’s rising employment attachment and 
economic resources on the retirement behavior of dual-earner couples, the findings reveal 
some other interesting developments. Using two definitions of retirement, the results 
clearly show a delay in the timing of retirement for later cohorts, consistent with their 
retirement expectations reported in chapter five.  As they reported in their baseline 
interviews, members of the early baby boom are working longer and fewer are retiring in 
their early 60s than in previous cohorts. Husbands are still retiring earlier than their wives 
on average, although the difference between these two groups has narrowed, perhaps 
reflecting increasing parity in life expectancy (Glei and Horiuchi 2007).  The cross-
cohort differences in retirement timing are largest when retirement is defined as 
collecting a pension or Social Security retirement income, perhaps due to fewer 
possessing good pensions that would enable early retirement or the larger penalties later 





The results show that retirement timing can differ greatly by cohort and sex, but a 
few factors had a consistent impact on the outcome measure.  In particular, age and 
retirement expectations were significantly associated with retirement across cohorts, sex, 
and retirement definitions. The fact that increases in age are associated with a greater 
likelihood of retirement is fairly self-evident. The constant impact of retirement 
expectations on actual retirement timing is less obvious, as expectations do not always 
line up with reality, but the results suggest that expecting to work after age 65 is 
associated with remaining in the labor force, at least in the early stages of the retirement 
transition. Besides age and retirement expectations, working full-time tends to decrease 
the risk of retirement for husbands, while being in an “other” work status usually 
increases the risk of retirement for both husbands and wives. Strong findings are also 
found with spousal health insurance and defined-benefit pension status.  Having a wife 
with employer health insurance increases the risk of retirement in most of the cohort 
models.  Husbands who have a wife with a defined-benefit pension are at higher risk of 
retirement in the HRS and war cohorts, but the risk of retirement for similar early baby 
boom men is lower, indicating that men’s retirement is becoming less responsive to at 
least some of their wives’ resources.  
As with other chapters in this dissertation, this analysis is limited in its 
generalizability and should be interpreted with caution.  The sample consists of dual-
earning couples, and although many Americans facing the retirement transition belong to 
such a household, it does not mean the findings here can be viewed as representative of 
the 50+ population at large. The determinants of retirement timing may very well differ 





couple households. However, Figures A7.1 and A7.2 show that retirement trajectories for 
men and women who are not part of a couple household are fairly similar to the sample 
used in this analysis, suggesting that selection may not be much of an issue.  The risk of 
retirement does appear to be higher for men and women in non-couple households, but 
the overall shape of the cumulative hazard rate parallels what occurs among dual-earner 
couples, with members of the HRS cohort most likely to have retired by the 4th wave after 
baseline and early baby boom individuals least likely to have retired by the 4th wave.  The 
analysis in this chapter also demonstrates the utility of employing multiple definitions of 
retirement in order to strengthen support for key insights. I utilize two definitions of 
retirement but there are certainly more that can be employed, as retirement has come to 
mean many different states of work and leisure.  Future research should continue to 
explore different methods of defining retirement as forthcoming cohorts reshape the 
retirement transition to fit their unique abilities, needs and desires.  
By employing a cohort analysis, the results from this chapter provide a first 
glimpse into how baby boom members are handling the retirement transition differently 
from earlier cohorts.  The results from this chapter support previous findings that work 
and family life influence the retirement timing of men and women (Preter et al. 2013). 
The retirement patterns of dual-earning couples are complex but the economic resources 
each partner brings to the household can affect the probability of each spouse 
transitioning to retirement. However, the results do not decisively show that women’s 
increased engagement in paid employment lessens the influence of their husbands’ 
retirement status on wives’ retirement timing, nor do these findings conclusively suggest 





presented here show that spouses do have a sizeable impact on the retirement transition of 
their partners, thereby supporting the life course concept of “linked lives” (Curl and 
Townshend 2008; Moen et al. 2001). This analysis makes a unique contribution by 
showing how the influence of market and spousal demands on retirement has changed for 






Chapter 8. Conclusion 
This dissertation has explored the impact of women’s rising employment 
attachment and resources on two major aspects of the retirement transition: retirement 
expectations and retirement timing.  Changes in the gender system have expanded 
women’s work opportunities and led to higher salaries and more fringe benefits such as 
defined-contribution pensions. Using data from 11 waves of the Health and Retirement 
Study, the analyses in this dissertation test the ways in which women’s possession of and 
level of economic resources relative to their spouse impact their own retirement timing as 
well as that of their husbands.  
The first analysis chapter looked at how retirement expectations change as 
women’s work resources grow.  This chapter also sought to examine whether husbands 
from the baby boom cohorts influence their wives less than previous cohorts due to 
women from later cohorts having more financial resources overall than prior generations. 
I find that the influence spouses exert on each other’s retirement expectations has waned 
for both partners, so while women are increasingly formulating their retirement 
expectations based on their own self-interest, their husbands are not more responsive to 
the greater amount of resources wives are bringing to households.  Holding other factors 
constant, the relationship between a person’s retirement expectations and that of their 
spouse is positive in every cohort examined here, but the magnitude of spousal influence 
is lower for later cohorts.  Thus, my results do not strongly support the hypothesis that 
husbands’ retirement expectations become more connected to their spouses as their 





that husbands influence wives’ retirement expectations less in later cohorts than in earlier 
ones. 
The second analysis chapter examined the synchronicity of couples’ retirement 
expectations.  I investigated whether women’s rising employment attachment and 
economic resources increase or decrease the likelihood of couples planning to retire 
jointly instead of sequentially.  The results suggest that most couples do not expect to 
retire at the same time but have different plans from each other.  The findings show either 
pessimism about their future ability to retire or a desire to remain working, as many 
individuals state they never plan to retire when asked what their planned retirement year 
is.  For couples who do have the same retirement expectations, most plan to never retire 
instead of in the same or an adjacent year.  
Using pooled models of dual-earner couples from three cohorts, I hypothesized 
that couples retire jointly (or have the same plans) when they both have the retirement 
resources to do so or have similar economic profiles and that couples in later cohorts will 
be more likely to synchronize their retirement than couples in earlier cohorts.  To test this 
hypothesis, I focus primarily on how resources are distributed within the household (e.g. 
only wife has pension, only husband has pension, both have pension) and whether one 
person expects to retire first when they possess a resource that their spouse lacks.  Two 
model specifications were applied; one which classifies couples into three categories 
(husband first, wife first, same plans) and one separating couples who both never plan to 
retire (or do not know) from couples who expect to retire together (i.e., within one 
calendar year of each other).  In general, the two types of couple households with the 





attachment (e.g. education, earnings, and total years in labor force) driving retirement 
expectations.  However, the model that distinguishes couples who both never plan to 
retire from those expecting to retire at the same time provides the strongest support for 
the hypothesis that couples retire together when they both have the resources to do so, as 
the results suggest that couples in which both spouses possess a pension are generally 
more likely to expect to retire jointly.   The findings also indicate that couples from later 
cohorts are more likely to plan for joint retirement, but the cohort differences are only 
marginally significant for the mid-baby boom cohort.  The differences in expected 
spousal retirement order across cohorts may be small, but it should also be noted that the 
HRS cohort (born 1936-1941) was not included in this analysis due to differences in the 
way in which this cohort was asked about their planned retirement year.  Overall, this 
chapter provided further evidence that the influence spouses have on each other is in 
decline, even if joint retirement has become more common. 
The final analysis chapter considered how husbands and wives affect each other’s 
retirement timing by following dual-earner couples from three cohorts for up to eight 
years after their baseline interview.  I hypothesized that women’s retirement timing 
would increasingly reflect their own attributes as their work attachment and employment 
resources grow, which for some involves remaining in the labor force and for others 
retirement.  I argued that wives’ greater engagement in the labor market would mean that 
their retirement timing would be increasingly derived from whatever path is best for 
themselves, regardless of whether or not it is optimal for their husbands.  Moreover, I 
hypothesized that husbands’ retirement timing should become more connected to their 





Lastly, I argued that this more egalitarian model of couple retirement should be more 
common in later cohorts than earlier cohorts.  I do find some evidence to suggest that 
husbands influence wives’ less in later cohorts than in earlier cohorts, but only the second 
measure of retirement (i.e. receiving retirement income) showed the retirement status of 
husbands on wives’ retirement timing weakened over time.  Overall, husbands’ labor 
force status still appears to be an important factor for wives’ retirement transitions. The 
results also confirm the notion that baby boomers are delaying retirement longer than 
earlier cohorts, as early baby boom men and women in this study were far less likely than 
the HRS cohort to either self-identify as retired or collect pensions or Social Security by 
the time they had reached the ages of early retirement. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 As with all studies, this dissertation contains limitations that restrict what kinds of 
inferences and generalizations can be made. The sample in this study only includes 
individuals in couple households where both spouses are working for pay, and although a 
majority of Americans in their 50s belong to such households, there are many important 
groups left out of the analyses.  As a result, the conclusions drawn from this paper cannot 
be applied to single, divorced, or widowed individuals who may reach the retirement 
transition in much more precarious positions than individuals in two-income households.  
  The longitudinal analysis in this dissertation only incorporates leading-edge baby 
boomers that were born in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  For decades now, much 
speculation has existed concerning how the baby boom will manage the retirement phase 
of the life course, and this study provides an initial view into how this demographic group 





boomers are distinct from prior cohorts, we will need much more time and data before we 
can generalize as to the entire generation born between the late 1940s and early 1960s.    
 The retirement transition is a very complex process, and as such there are 
numerous ways in which one can analyze retirement expectations and timing. The first 
two analysis chapters were cross-sectional in nature, but exciting work remains to be 
done in how retirement expectations change over time.  The final chapter shows 
retirement expectations to be an enduring predictor of retirement timing, but little work 
has explored what factors lead dual-earner couples to alter their expectations.   
 The final analysis chapter did not distinguish between partly and completely 
retired individuals.  Bridge employment has become an increasingly common first step in 
the retirement transition, and individuals who enter retirement without fully exiting the 
labor force may be different from those who completely cease paid employment.  When 
future waves of data become available, sample sizes should be sufficiently large enough 
to see if the determinants of falling into partial versus complete retirement are 
dramatically different across cohorts or other socioeconomic characteristics.  Additional 
data will also allow scholars to extend previous research on transitions (Curl and 
Townsend 2008), conducting cross-cohort analyses that focus on couple-level patterns in 
the numbers and types of retirement transitions (e.g. both husband and wife experience 
one transition from work to complete retirement, both experience two transitions from 
work to partial retirement to complete retirement, etc.).  
Finally, the analyses in this chapter only follow couples for eight years so that 





available, researchers will be able to follow the early baby boom cohort for longer 
durations and eventually be able to incorporate later cohorts.  
Limitations notwithstanding, this study provides useful information about the 
retirement transition. This study uses timely, nationally-representative data across a 
period of 20 years to highlight the changing context of retirement for couples in light of 
increasing economic insecurity and women’s greater engagement in the labor market.  
Unlike the majority of previous research on retirement, this study utilizes information on 
the employment and economic characteristics of spouses to examine if the narrowing of 
gender differences has led to changes over time in the retirement decisions of husbands 
and wives.  Retirement trajectories have become increasingly heterogeneous, and despite 
women’s economic progress, still follow gendered paths.  The findings presented here 
indicate that rather than entering a new era of cooperation, couples are moving more 
towards a model in which each makes their own separate retirement decisions. While the 
reasons for couples’ lives being more loosely linked are numerous, the rise of 
“individualized marriage” and the availability of more alternatives to foster an 
independent and meaningful personal life may in part account for the weakening of 
spousal influence on retirement behavior (Cherlin 2004).   
With institutionalized scripts for retirement breaking down, each couple must 
chart their own path and work out their own arrangements. This dissertation provides a 
guide as to what social and economic forces shape the lives of individuals retiring in the 
21st century.  The retirement transition is embedded within institutional, familial, and 





diversity in order to more fully understand the expectations and decisions of couples 





















Table 5.1. Descriptive Characteristics by Gender and Birth Cohort at Baseline Interview: HRS Dual-Earner Couples 
  
HRS Cohort (1992)                          
(1936-1941)  
War Babies  (1998)                    
(1942-1947) 
Early Boomers (2004)       
(1948-1953) 





















    
  
    
Age (mean) 54 51.4 52.6 50.5 52.4 50.7 52.7 51.5 
% Non-Hispanic White 87.8 88.4 90.4 90.4 83.5 83.8 81.5 80.9 
% Non-Hispanic Black 6.2 5.9 4.2 4.5 5.9 5.3 7.4 6.8 
% Hispanic 3.9 3.8 4 4.5 6 6.9 6.1 7.3 
% College graduate 24.5 17.1 41 32.9 38.5 32.8 36.5 41.6 
% Working full-time 94.4 70.7 94.6 76.6 93.1 75.7 93.8 74.2 
Job stressful (% agree or strongly agree) 65 67.7 70.5 70.6 69.1 70.8 71.5 72.5 
Job physically demanding (% agree or 
strongly agree) 38.8 33.8 32.9 29.4 38.2 32.3 36.6 31.2 
Current earnings $$ (mean) 65,730.9 35,102.4 77,908.6 42,644.6 93,260.5 49,165.9 84,955.0 53,241.2 
Total years spent in labor force (mean) 35.1 25.1 33.9 26.9 32.6 27.2 25.3 23 
% Employer health insurance 71.7 44.5 80.2 59.7 67.2 54 65.1 53.5 
% Health-related fair or poor 10.1 6.6 12 9.9 12.9 11.4 9.3 10.8 
% Defined Benefit 46.8 36 45.5 33.9 31.2 30.1 33.2 31 
% Defined Contribution Only 18.9 19.4 22.6 26.4 32.6 31.6 36.3 30.5 
% Employer retiree health insurance 50.6 25.4 31.4 20.1 29.8 17.8 18.4 12 
% Missing retiree health insurance 7.4 8.7 17.7 13.8 8.7 8.1 9.9 5.9 
Expectation work full time after 65 (mean) 28 19.2 33.3 20.4 38.8 24 40.2 32.4 
Couple and Household Characteristics 
 
              
Spousal Contribution to Household     
Earnings (mean) 36.9 63.2 37.6 62.4 39.4 60.6 40.7 59.3 






Table 5.1. Continued 
 
HRS Cohort (1992)                          
(1936-1941)  
War Babies  (1998)                    
(1942-1947) 
Early Boomers (2004)       
(1948-1953) 
Mid Boomers (2010)     
(1954-1959) 
Total wealth (excluding residence) (mean) 279,629.4 353,517.6 317,971.6 293,608.3 
% Only Wife’s Job has retiree health 
insurance  11.3 9.5 9.7 9.4 
% Only Husband’s Job has retiree health 
insurance  35.6 20.2 21.7 15.9 
% Both spouses have retiree health 
insurance 12.6 7.9 6.6 1.9 
% Neither spouse has retiree health 
insurance 26.2 35.4 46.8 58.2 
% Either spouse missing retiree health 
insurance 14.3 27 15.2 14.5 
% Wife Has Pension but husband does not 15.1 17.7 16.8 17.3 
% Husband has pension but wife does not 25.2 25.4 19 24.8 
% Both Spouses have Pension 40.4 42.6 44.9 44.4 
% Neither Spouse has Pension 19.3 14.2 19.3 13.4 


















Table 5.2a. Mean Probability of Working Full-Time Past Age 65 Among Dual-Earner Couples at Baseline by Individual 
Characteristics 
  
HRS Cohort (1992)                          
(1936-1941)  
War Babies  (1998)                    
(1942-1947) 
Early Boomers  (2004)       
(1948-1953) 



















Overall Mean 28.0 19.2 33.3 20.4 38.8 24.0 40.2 32.4 
Non-Hispanic White 28.2 19.2 34.4 20.9 39.2 24.1 40.5 32.1 
Non-Hispanic Black 19.2 18.7 12.8 15.2 34.3 18.7 31.5 31.0 
Hispanic 29.1 17.0 26.7 15.7 40.9 26.6 36.9 27.8 
No living children 23.5 24.2 30.7 21.0 39.2 14.2 32.6 34.1 
At least one living child 28.1 19.0 33.4 20.4 38.8 24.5 40.5 32.4 
Less than college 26.2 19.1 28.8 18.5 35.9 22.8 37.8 33.4 
BA+ 33.5 19.6 39.8 24.2 43.4 26.5 44.4 31.2 
Working part-time 31.9 15.6 33.6 12.9 47.5 20.0 46.0 23.4 
Working full-time 27.8 20.6 33.3 22.7 38.1 25.3 39.8 35.6 
Job not stressful  29.5 16.8 31.6 17.6 39.6 24.0 43.7 30.6 
Job stressful  27.2 20.3 34.1 21.5 38.4 24.0 38.8 33.2 
Job not physically demanding  28.0 19.8 33.0 21.1 40.6 23.7 39.8 32.3 
Job physically demanding  28.0 18.0 33.9 18.7 35.8 24.7 41.0 32.9 
Earnings Bottom third 34.4 20.0 40.8 20.4 42.0 25.6 47.9 32.6 
Earnings Middle third 28.8 18.0 31.9 22.7 40.0 23.8 43.1 31.2 
Earnings Top third 25.1 19.3 31.7 16.1 36.7 21.1 36.2 33.8 
Less than 20 years in labor force  30.5 15.9 17.0 16.8 45.0 25.7 45.1 34.1 






Table 5.2a. Continued.  
 
HRS Cohort (1992)                          
(1936-1941) 
War Babies  (1998)                    
(1942-1947) 
Early Boomers  (2004)     
(1948-1953) 



















No Employer health insurance 41.5 19.1 33.4 22.2 44.0 22.6 46.6 30.5 
Employer health insurance 22.7 19.3 33.3 19.2 36.2 25.2 36.8 34.1 
Good to Excellent Health 28.8 19.3 34.0 21.1 39.3 24.2 40.0 33.5 
Fair or Poor health 20.6 17.8 28.2 14.2 35.4 22.8 42.4 24.1 
No pension 41.6 24.4 45.2 20.8 49.2 27.2 53.0 35.3 
Defined Benefit Pension 18.4 14.4 23.9 19.0 28.8 21.3 26.4 26.3 
Defined Contribution Pension 26.8 16.0 35.5 21.5 36.8 22.7 42.2 35.2 
No Employer retiree health 
insurance 28.6 20.2 34.7 15.9 33.1 24.3 34.8 34.6 
Employer retiree health insurance 19.9 18.3 24.7 22.7 33.6 24.5 31.5 30.9 
Wealth Bottom third 30.2 20.8 36.2 24.4 41.4 24.7 44.1 38.2 
Wealth Middle third 24.6 17.6 28.1 19.2 37.3 26.7 39.2 29.4 
Wealth Top third 29.4 19.2 35.9 17.7 38.0 21.2 38.8 31.3 
















Table 5.2b: Mean Probability of Working Past Age 65 Among Dual-Earner Couples at Baseline by Couple Characteristics 
  
HRS Cohort (1992)                          
(1936-1941)  
War Babies  (1998)                    
(1942-1947) 
Early Boomers  (2004)       
(1948-1953) 



























Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health 
Insurance  
32.6 19.9 28.7 20.5 37.4 30.9 42.1 32.2 
Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health 
Insurance  
19.9 14.2 23.2 18.5 32.7 25.2 33.2 27.7 
Both Spouses have Retiree Health   
Insurance 
18.3 17.4 23.8 24.4 33.7 18.0 22.7 31.0 
Neither Spouse has Retiree Health 
Insurance 
37.0 25.7 34.0 18.9 37.7 21.1 39.0 34.8 
Either Spouse Missing Retiree Health 
Insurance 










Wife has pension but husband does not 38.0 18.6 45.5 25.3 42.6 26.8 49.5 36.7 
Husband has pension but wife does not 20.8 18.7 29.8 17.0 33.8 21.2 38.8 32.6 
Both Spouses have Pension 20.9 13.6 26.6 17.9 32.5 20.2 32.7 28.4 
Neither Spouse has Pension 44.5 31.9 44.7 27.8 55.0 33.1 55.6 40.3 









Earnings less than 50% of household 
earnings 
26.3 23.0 30.6 23.1 38.4 29.3 40.0 35.1 
Earnings 50% - 100% of household 
earnings 
32.8 18.2 40.5 19.7 39.5 22.0 40.6 31.4 








































       Age 2.105* -0.216 0.285 -0.193 
  
--- 
Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
       Non-Hispanic Black -16.59* -28.37* -11.42+ -20.28*** 
   Non-Hispanic Other 7.191 -12.59 -14.32+ 7.802 
   Hispanic 0.803 -0.897 -0.240 -9.627+ 
   No. of living children -0.0443 1.206 -0.114 1.664 
   BA+ 22.88*** 28.07*** 10.20* 9.857* 
   Full-time 12.35 26.57* -1.644 2.156 
   Job Stressful -3.133 5.882 -3.613 1.970 
   Job Physically Demanding 2.599 7.551 -6.884 -1.492 
   Earnings in $10K units -0.116 -0.228 0.215* -0.124 
   Total years in labor force 0.341 1.228+ 0.320 -0.199 
   Employer Health Insurance -14.30* -0.313 -3.706 -4.201 
   Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent) -17.07+ -12.82 -8.469 -2.706 
   
        Spousal and Couple Characteristics 
       Wealth in $100K units 0.290 0.513 -1.034** -0.897*  --- --- 
Spouse Probability of Work After 65 0.584*** 0.483*** 0.308*** 0.218*** 
 
-- --- 
Spouse Age -0.142 -0.849 -0.246 0.575 
   Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: Good to 
Excellent) 
5.055 15.98 4.243 6.243 
   Ref: Both Spouses have Retiree Health Insurance     
   Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health Insurance  4.169 12.60 -5.857 2.412 



































Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health Insurance  1.924 10.07 -11.78 -2.175 
   Neither have Retiree Health Insurance 11.13 19.31 -4.102 -0.134 
   Either Missing Retiree Health Insurance 24.13** 26.70* 11.29 18.42+ 
   Ref: Both Spouses have Pension 
       Wife has Pension but Husband does not 24.12*** 28.52*** 15.12* 21.18*** 
   Husband has Pension but Wife does not 2.437 1.906 6.487 5.605 
   Neither have Pension 28.22*** 25.67*** 28.65*** 12.81* 
   Spousal Contribution to Household Earnings -0.0445 -0.150 -0.0445 -0.0888 
   N 1150 369 485 566       
Source: HRS, Author's calculations, adjusted for complex survey design; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.0001 



















































       
Age -0.629 1.122 0.300 0.318 
   
Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
       
Non-Hispanic Black -4.723 -11.36 -0.642 -4.684 
   
Non-Hispanic Other -1.712 2.451 0.427 4.940 
   
Hispanic -7.425 -12.12 0.641 -8.362 
   
No. of living children -0.359 4.095* -2.537* -0.734 ++ 
  
BA+ 6.876 12.60* 6.939+ 4.589 
   
Full-time 14.56** 18.21* 11.81* 15.27** 
   
Job Stressful 0.930 0.814 -1.073 3.680 
   
Job Physically Demanding -6.281 -2.562 -1.000 -2.052 
   
Earnings in $10K units -1.050 -0.125 -0.927 -0.315 
   
Total years in labor force 0.452+ 0.517 -0.185 -0.213 
   
Employer Health Insurance 2.692 -11.80 -1.296 0.228 
   
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent) -15.96+ -13.21 -1.784 -9.157* 
   
        
Spousal and Couple Characteristics 
       
Wealth in $100K units -0.176 -0.750+ -0.749* -0.308  --  
Spouse Probability of Work After 65 0.477*** 0.342*** 0.269*** 0.206*** 
 
-- -- 
Spouse Age -0.314 0.0127 -0.774 -0.160 
   Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: Good to 
Excellent) 0.0660 2.846 6.830 1.115 
   
Ref: Both Spouses have Retiree Health Insurance 
       































Significant Change (ref: HRS 
Cohort) 
 







Only Husband’s Job has Retiree 
Health Insurance  -11.00 -7.073 5.607 -9.028 
   
Neither have Retiree Health Insurance -4.806 -18.71+ -1.594 -5.070 
   Either Missing Retiree Health 
Insurance -3.214 -5.856 8.926 -8.573 
   
Ref: Both Spouses have Pension 
       Wife has Pension but Husband does 
not -1.434 11.35 4.657 7.862+ 
   Husband has Pension but Wife does 
not 24.58*** 6.976 6.395 9.570* 
   
Neither have Pension 33.15*** 23.15* 11.23* 16.23** 
 
-- -- 
Spousal Contribution to Household 
Earnings -0.251* -0.0624 -0.184 -0.0622 
   
N 1150 369 485 566       
Source: HRS, Author's calculations, adjusted for complex survey design; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.0001    





Table 6.1. Joint and sequential retirement expectations among dual earner couples by cohort 
  All Cohorts War Babies Early Baby Boom Mid Baby Boom 
  (1942-1959) (1942-1947) (1948-1953) (1954-1959) 
     
Retirement Plans %  (n=1,454)  (n=379) (n=491) (n=584) 
Husband first  32.1 33.2 30.6 32.7 
Wife first  40.7 41.7 40.9 39.7 
Same plans  27.2 25.1 28.5 27.6 
Same year or adjacent year 6.9 6.6 7.1 6.8 
Never/Don't Know 20.4 18.5 21.4 20.7 
     Husband first  % (n=467) (n=126) (n=150) (n=191) 
Wide margin (4 years of more) 19.5 20.6 17.3 20.4 
Narrow margin (3 years or less) 16.5 18.3 18 14.1 
Wife non-responsive (Never or 
don't know) 64 61.1 64.7 65.4 
     Wife first % (n=591) (n=158) (n=201) (n=232) 
Wide margin (4 years of more) 12.2 9.5 10.4 15.5 
Narrow margin (3 years or less) 12.9 13.3 13.9 11.6 
Husband non-responsive  
(Never or don't know) 75 77.2 75.6 72.8 
     Same plans % (n=396) (n=95) (n=140) (n=161) 
Never  73.2 71.6 73.6 73.9 
Same year  11.4 10.5 12.9 10.6 
Adjacent years  13.9 15.8 12.1 14.3 
Don't know 1.5 2.1 1.4 1.2 






Table 6.2. Couple Characteristics by Retirement Patterns 
  All Cohorts (1942-1959) 
Variables Husband first Wife first Same Plans 







Non-Hispanic White                 67.7                  70.9                  75.8  
Non-Hispanic Black                 12.4                  13.4                  10.1  
Non-Hispanic Other                   5.6                    3.6                    2.3  
Hispanic                 14.3                  12.2                  11.9  
Less than BA                 66.0                  71.1                  64.4  
BA+                 34.0                  28.9                  35.6  
Job not stressful                 33.0                  29.9                  28.0  
Job stressful                 67.0                  70.1                  72.0  
Job not physically demanding                 64.5                  65.8                  68.4  
Job physically demanding                 35.5                  34.2                  31.6  
PT                 24.0                  24.7                  23.5  
FT                 76.0                  75.3                  76.5  
Good to excellent health                 86.5                  85.8                  87.4  
Fair to poor health                 13.5                  14.2                  12.6  
No employer health insurance                 51.8                  55.7                  54.0  
Employer health insurance                 48.2                  44.3                  46.0  
Age (mean)                 50.6                  51.2                  51.4  
Earnings (mean)          43,606.5           44,188.7           50,062.9  
Total years in labor force (mean)                 24.4                  24.7                  24.8  
Husband Characteristics   
  
Non-Hispanic White                 68.1                  72.3                  76.0  
Non-Hispanic Black                 13.9                  12.9                  10.9  
Non-Hispanic Other                   5.1                    3.4                    2.3  
Hispanic                 12.8                  11.5                  10.9  
Less than BA                 68.5                  65.0                  64.9  
BA+                 31.5                  35.0                  35.1  
Job not stressful                 32.1                  31.1                  31.6  
Job stressful                 67.9                  68.9                  68.4  
Job not physically demanding                 57.8                  58.4                  62.9  







Table 6.2. Continued 
  All Cohorts (1942-1959) 
Variables Husband first Wife first Same Plans 
PT                   7.3                    7.4                    8.1  
FT                 92.7                  92.6                  91.9  
Good to excellent health                 85.9                  85.4                  88.4  
Fair to poor health                 14.1                  14.6                  11.6  
No employer health insurance                 54.4                  55.2                  55.1  
Employer health insurance                 45.6                  44.8                  44.9  
Age (mean)                 52.9                  52.5                  52.9  
Earnings (mean)          69,894.8           76,845.4           83,427.5  
Total years in labor force (mean)                 28.5                  29.5                  30.1  
Household Characteristics   
 
  
Age difference (mean)                   2.2                    1.3                    1.4  
No. of living children                   2.7                    2.7                    2.7  
Wife contribution to household earnings                 39.3                  40.9                  41.3  
Total Wealth (mean)        221,383.0         278,596.4         313,313.4  
Wife has pension but not husband 13.9 20.0 21.2 
Husband has pension but not wife 24.0 20.6 21.2 
Both spouses have pension 43.9 37.9 39.1 
Neither spouse has pension 18.2 21.5 18.4 
Only wife's job has retiree health insurance  10.3 12.2 8.1 
Only husband's job has retiree health insurance  22.9 17.9 14.1 
Both spouses have retiree health insurance 5.8 6.1 5.8 
Neither spouse has retiree health insurance 46.9 47.0 54.3 
Either Spouse Missing Retiree Health Insurance 14.1 16.8 17.7 
N 467 591 396 
Source: Author's calculations, adjusted for complex survey design; wealth and earnings in 2014 dollars, 















Table 6.3. Couple Retirement Plans-Pooled Across Cohorts   
  
Husband 1st vs. Same 
Expectations 
Wife 1st vs. Same 
Expectations 
Cohort 
  Ref: War Babies 
  Early Baby Boomers 0.764 0.846 
Mid Baby Boomers 0.712+ 0.862 
Wife Characteristics 
  Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
  Non-Hispanic Black 0.930 2.463+ 
Non-Hispanic Other 2.331* 2.024 
Hispanic 1.363 1.054 
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent) 0.961 1.055 
Employer Health Insurance 1.071 0.932 
Earnings in $10K units 0.998 0.975 
BA+ 1.234 0.730+ 
Job Stressful 0.823 0.978 
Job Physically Demanding 1.061 1.043 
Full-time 0.988 0.906 
Total years in labor force 1.017+ 1.007 
Wife Contribution to Household Earnings 0.991 1.001 
Husband Characteristics 
  Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
  Non-Hispanic Black 1.384 0.528 
Non-Hispanic Other 1.831 1.068 
Hispanic 0.977 0.972 
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent) 1.104 1.288 
Employer Health Insurance 1.183 1.108 
Earnings in $10K units 0.970* 0.998 
BA+ 0.901 1.404* 
Job Stressful 1.063 1.073 
Job Physically Demanding 1.244 1.195 
Full-time 0.989 1.127 
Total years in labor force 0.970** 0.993 
Age 0.934+ 0.926* 
Couple Characteristics 
  Wealth in $100K units 0.994 1.001 
No. of living children 0.995 0.970 
Age Difference 1.122*** 1.028 
Ref: Both have Retiree Health Insurance 
  Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health Insurance  1.570 1.479 
Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health Insurance  1.564 1.178 
Neither have Retiree Health Insurance 0.859 0.779 
Either Missing Retiree Health Insurance 0.882 0.883 
Ref: Both have Pension 
  Wife has Pension but not Husband 0.520** 0.893 
Husband has Pension but not Wife 0.886 0.958 
Neither have Pension 0.755 1.162 
N 1,454 
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; Adjusted for complex survey design; Coefficients are relative risk 
ratios 
+ p<0.10, *p<0.05,**p<.01, ***p<.001 





Table 6.4. Couple Retirement Plans-Pooled Four Category Model     
  
Husband 1st 
vs. Same Time 
Wife 1st vs. 




   Ref: War Babies 
   Early Baby Boomers 0.856 0.951 1.168 
Mid Baby Boomers 0.903 1.081 1.326 
Wife Characteristics 
   Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
   Non-Hispanic Black 0.214+ 0.595 0.156* 
Non-Hispanic Other 1.676 1.512 0.669 
Hispanic 0.755 0.568 0.422+ 
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent) 1.155 1.284 1.296 
Employer Health Insurance 0.933 0.755 0.737 
Earnings in $10K units 0.982 0.959 0.979 
BA+ 1.820* 1.073 1.666+ 
Job Stressful 0.865 1.018 1.054 
Job Physically Demanding 1.422 1.395 1.463 
Full-time 1.084 0.995 1.130 
Total years in labor force 1.029+ 1.018 1.014 
Wife Contribution to Household Earnings 0.988 0.998 0.996 
Husband Characteristics 
   Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
   Non-Hispanic Black 5.767* 2.125 5.944* 
Non-Hispanic Other 2.328 1.365 1.330 
Hispanic 1.869 1.903 2.498 
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent) 1.707 1.974 1.721 
Employer Health Insurance 1.056 1.082 1.035 
Earnings in $10K units 0.959* 0.987+ 0.986 
BA+ 1.003 1.560+ 1.147 
Job Stressful 0.745 0.748 0.631+ 
Job Physically Demanding 1.138 1.086 0.890 
Full-time 0.932 1.043 0.890 
Total years in labor force 0.972 0.995 1.002 
Age 0.897* 0.890+ 0.952 
Couple Characteristics 
   Wealth in $100K units 1.029 1.037 1.043 
No. of living children 0.956 0.930 0.950 
Age Difference 1.134** 1.033 1.006 
Ref: Both have Retiree Health Insurance 
   Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health Insurance  1.353 1.276 0.800 
Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health Insurance  2.377* 1.778 1.750 
Neither have Retiree Health Insurance 0.875 0.792 1.052 
Either Missing Retiree Health Insurance 1.411 1.422 1.882 
Ref: Both have Pension 
   Wife has Pension but not Husband 0.888 1.515 1.988* 
Husband has Pension but not Wife 1.840+ 1.980+ 2.584** 
Neither have Pension 1.868 2.848** 3.185** 
N 1,454 
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; Adjusted for complex survey design; Coefficients are relative risk 






Table 7.1a. Percent Entering Retirement by Gender and Cohort by 4th wave: Self-Identification 
Definition 
  
HRS Cohort                          
(1936-1941)  
War Babies                     
(1942-1947) 
Early Boomers         
(1948-1953) 
Characteristic Husbands  Wives  Husbands    Wives  Husbands Wives 
Overall  46.0 36.0 36.6 30.2 31.7 28.0 
Less than college 46.4 36.0 37.8 30.7 32.4 26.1 
BA+ 44.4 35.9 35.0 29.2 30.8 31.7 
Earnings Bottom third 49.3 37.9 38.5 31.8 38.4 33.1 
Earnings Middle third 42.1 35.7 41.3 26.3 30.5 22.1 
Earnings Top third 47.1 34.2 31.8 34.7 29.3 28.0 
DB Pension 54.5 37.2 41.8 30.2 32.8 30.4 
DC Pension Only 27.5 30.2 31.2 21.2 43.8 16.9 
No Pension 47.3 37.6 34.1 36.3 33.1 30.8 
Wife's job has retiree health 
insurance but not husband 45.2 35.6 23.9 27.0 23.6 25.5 
Husband's job has retiree 
health insurance but not 
wife 53.9 39.6 48.8 39.1 33.6 29.0 
Both spouses have retiree 
health insurance 51.7 34.1 54.2 44.4 35.1 38.3 
Neither spouse has retiree 
health insurance 42.8 35.8 33.4 23.8 32.9 28.8 
Either spouse missing retiree 
health insurance 32.5 33.0 25.7 25.5 32.4 24.8 
Wealth Bottom third 36.8 30.3 29.7 22.4 28.9 26.8 
Wealth Middle third 45.2 34.1 42.4 33.2 31.2 25.7 

























Table 7.1b. Percent Entering Retirement by Gender and Cohort by 4th wave: Collecting Pension or 
Social Security Definition 
  
HRS Cohort                          
(1936-1941)  
War Babies                     
(1942-1947) 
Early Boomers         
(1948-1953) 
Characteristic Husbands  Wives  Husbands    Wives  Husbands Wives 
Overall  49.4 24.0 32.8 14.5 20.5 16.5 
Less than college 49.4 22.9 29.8 13.8 19.7 16.0 
BA+ 49.6 29.9 36.8 16.2 22.0 17.6 
Earnings Bottom third 54.7 24.7 38.9 12.5 31.1 17.5 
Earnings Middle third 43.7 25.6 35.5 16.4 18.0 17.0 
Earnings Top third 50.8 22.1 27.9 17.2 16.7 14.7 
DB Pension 52.5 27.5 32.8 22.0 17.6 21.0 
DC Pension Only 31.5 13.4 27.0 6.2 3.4 4.3 
No Pension 54.9 25.3 35.3 13.9 25.0 15.4 
Wife's job has retiree health 
insurance but not husband 53.2 34.6 27.7 14.9 17 21.5 
Husband's job has retiree 
health insurance but not 
wife 62.6 20.1 41.9 16.3 20.8 13.3 
Both spouses have retiree 
health insurance 51.1 33.6 42.6 39.5 21.3 26.0 
Neither spouse has retiree 
health insurance 47.2 25.7 28.9 11.3 19.8 17.7 
Either spouse missing retiree 
health insurance 28.1 18.2 30.2 4.1 25.7 9.7 
Wealth Bottom third 46.4 24.8 26.6 8.1 17.8 13.3 
Wealth Middle third 49.3 21.6 38.9 17.5 18.3 14.5 




















Table 7.2a. Hazard of Retirement by Cohort Using Self-identification Definition: Husbands 
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
  HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Individual Characteristics 
     Agea 1.217*** 1.186*** 1.177*** 
  Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
     Non-Hispanic Black 0.898 0.639 1.414 
  Hispanic 0.942 1.130 0.888 
  No. of living children 1.033+ 1.003 1.037** ---- 
 Ref: <HS 
     HS/GED 1.193+ 1.067 1.176 
  Some college 1.117+ 1.117 1.320   
BA+ 1.135*** 1.090 1.601 
  Ref: Part-Time 
     Full-Timea 0.682*** 0.399*** 0.816 
  Other work statusa 1.349 1.651 2.431*** 
 
++++ 
Job Stressfula 1.018*** 0.990 0.661* ---- -- 
Job Physically Demandinga 1.002 0.990 0.786*** 
 
- 
Earnings in $10K unitsa 1.000 0.977*** 1.007+ - 
 Total years in labor forcea 1.007 0.970*** 1.029 --- 
 Employer Health Insurancea 1.018 0.751 0.430*** 
 
---- 
DB Pensiona 1.044 1.334*** 0.938 
  DC Pensiona 0.527*** 1.052 0.868 ++++ ++++ 
Probability of Work After 65a 0.987*** 0.985** 0.984*** 
  Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 1.225 1.546 1.763*** 
 
++++ 
Spousal and Couple Characteristics 
     Wealth in $100K unitsa 1.019*** 1.001 0.997 ---- ---- 
Spousal Retirement Statusa 1.211+ 1.159 0.801 
  Spousal Probability of Work After 65a 0.999 0.995 0.990** 






Table 7.2a. Continued.  
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
 
HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 1.113 0.775 0.961 
  Spouse Employer Health Insurancea 1.039* 1.382+ 1.537*** 
  Ref: Both Spouses Have Retiree Health Insurance 
     Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  0.847 0.309*** 0.407* ---- 
 Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  0.990 0.906 0.916*** 
  Neither have Retiree Health Insurancea 0.879*** 0.564*** 0.756*** -- + 
Either Missing Retiree Health Insurancea 0.681*** 0.442*** 0.913 - 
 Spouse DB Pensiona 1.196 1.802* 0.788+ 
 
--- 
Spouse DC Pensiona 0.893 1.102 1.030 
 
++++ 
Spousal Contribution to Household Earningsa 1.003 1.003 1.009* 
  N 1062 348 430 
  Person Records 3237 1139 1380     
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; Coefficients are hazard ratios; +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001;  
Positive interactions: +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001; Negative interactions: -p<.10,--p<.05,---p<.01,----p<.001 





















Table 7.2b. Hazard of Retirement by Cohort Using Self-Identification Definition: Wives 
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
  HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Individual Characteristics 
     Agea 1.163*** 1.140*** 1.202** 
  Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
     Non-Hispanic Black 0.815 0.476 1.655 -- 
 Hispanic 0.526* 0.439** 1.707*** 
 
++++ 




     HS/GED 0.987 1.242 1.012 
 
- 
Some college 0.922 1.363 0.952 
 
--- 




     Full-Timea 0.639*** 0.626** 1.197 
 
++++ 
Other work statusa 0.985 1.551* 3.278*** ++ ++++ 
Job Stressfula 1.139 1.092 1.182** 
  Job Physically Demandinga 0.962*** 1.201 1.102 ++++ +++ 
Earnings in $10K unitsa 1.005 1.026*** 0.964** 
 
-- 
Total years in labor forcea 1.006*** 1.004 1.036* ---- 
 Employer Health Insurancea 0.702*** 0.955 0.548** 
  DB Pensiona 1.161 1.117 1.163* 
  DC Pensiona 0.977 0.848 0.712 ---- - 
Probability of Work After 65a 0.987*** 0.983*** 0.976** -- 
 Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 1.630** 2.381+ 1.965*** 
 
++++ 
Spousal and Couple Characteristics 
     Wealth in $100K unitsa 1.018*** 1.002 1.014 - 
 Spousal Retirement Statusa 1.566*** 1.163 2.873*** 
  Spousal Probability of Work After 65a 0.995*** 0.993* 1.004** 
 
++++ 







Table 7.2b. Continued 
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
  HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 0.968 0.996 0.817 
  Spouse Employer Health Insurancea 0.986 0.328*** 1.115 
  Ref: Both Spouses Have Retiree Health Insurance 
     Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  0.982 1.305 0.880 
  Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  0.817 0.730 0.635 
  Neither have Retiree Health Insurancea 0.796 0.654*** 0.837 
  Either Missing Retiree Health Insurancea 0.826 0.712 0.497 
  Spouse DB Pensiona 1.118 0.926 1.488 
  Spouse DC Pensiona 1.018 0.952 1.845** 
 
++++ 
Spousal Contribution to Household Earningsa 1.002 1.000 1.004 
  N 1069 351 427 
  Person Records 3368 1167 1367     
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; Coefficients are hazard ratios; +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001;  
Positive interactions: +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001; Negative interactions: -p<.10,--p<.05,---p<.01,----p<.001 




















Table 7.3a. Hazard of Retirement by Cohort Using Pension or Social Security Collection Definition: Husbands 
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
  HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Individual Characteristics 
     Agea 1.196*** 1.198*** 1.350* ++++ 
 Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
     Non-Hispanic Black 0.906 0.942 2.109*** 
 
++++ 
Hispanic 0.868 1.314*** 1.153 
 
+++ 
No. of living children 1.011 1.069 0.960 
  Ref: <HS 
     HS/GED 1.153*** 1.473** 1.025 
 
-- 
Some college 1.139 1.163 0.494** 
 
---- 
BA+ 1.232*** 2.703* 1.341 ++ 
 Ref: Part-Time 
     Full-Timea 0.854*** 0.593*** 0.532+ ---- -- 
Other work statusa 2.058*** 2.849*** 2.245 ++ 
 Job Stressfula 1.004 0.743 0.928 ---- -- 
Job Physically Demandinga 0.932*** 1.752 1.182 +++ ++++ 
Earnings in $10K unitsa 1.004*** 1.023 0.987 
  Total years in labor forcea 1.013*** 1.033*** 1.036 
 
+ 
Employer Health Insurancea 0.871*** 0.995 1.122 ++++ 
 DB Pensiona 1.058 1.574*** 1.093 +++ 
 DC Pensiona 0.698 1.144*** 0.703 
  Probability of Work After 65a 0.993*** 0.986*** 0.988*** ---- ---- 
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 1.195*** 1.737*** 1.426 
  Spousal and Couple Characteristics 
     Wealth in $100K unitsa 0.995** 0.988* 0.981+ ---- ---- 
Spousal Retirement Statusa 1.382** 1.161 0.607 
  Spousal Probability of Work After 65a 0.999 1.001 0.999 







Table 7.3a continued. 
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
  HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 1.318 1.355 1.343* 
 
+++ 
Spouse Employer Health Insurancea 1.257** 0.972 1.287*** 
 
--- 
Ref: Both Spouses Have Retiree Health Insurance 
     Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  0.937 0.575* 1.027 ---- 
 Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  1.129 1.239 0.811 
 
-- 
Neither have Retiree Health Insurancea 0.805 0.742 0.854 
  Either Missing Retiree Health Insurancea 0.596* 0.810 1.097 
 
++++ 
Spouse DB Pensiona 1.044* 1.200 0.703*** + ---- 
Spouse DC Pensiona 1.110*** 0.826*** 1.287*** --- + 
Spousal Contribution to Household Earningsa 1.000 1.002+ 1.000 
 
+++ 
N 1065 337 422 
  Person Records 3191 1106 1396     
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; Coefficients are hazard ratios; +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001; 
Positive interactions: +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001; Negative interactions: -p<.10,--p<.05,---p<.01,----p<.001 



















Table 7.3b. Hazard of Retirement by Cohort Using Pension or Social Security Collection Definition: Wives 
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
  HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Individual Characteristics 
     Agea 1.397*** 1.382*** 1.403*** --- - 
Ref: Non-Hispanic White 
     Non-Hispanic Black 0.915 0.852 1.180 
  Hispanic 0.611 1.611+ 1.530* 
 
+ 




     HS/GED 0.944 0.572 0.530 - 
 Some college 0.725*** 0.694 0.401 
  BA+ 1.163+ 0.763 0.401 -- 
 Ref: Part-Time 
     Full-Timea 1.009 0.871 1.025 
  Other work statusa 1.753*** 4.819* 1.580** 
 
---- 
Job Stressfula 1.207+ 0.886** 1.391*** 
 
++++ 
Job Physically Demandinga 0.876 0.842 0.886 
 
++ 
Earnings in $10K unitsa 1.013* 0.981 0.953+ 
 
---- 
Total years in labor forcea 1.012 1.025 1.023** 
  Employer Health Insurancea 0.948 0.705*** 1.216 
  DB Pensiona 1.353 3.692 1.845*** + 
 DC Pensiona 0.672+ 0.923 0.970 
  Probability of Work After 65a 0.991*** 0.991+ 0.986*** 
  Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 0.977 1.346 0.886 +++ 
 Spousal and Couple Characteristics 
     Wealth in $100K unitsa 1.003 0.986 1.032*** 
 
++++ 
Spousal Retirement Statusa 1.626*** 0.826** 1.199 -- --- 
Spousal Probability of Work After 65a 0.999 0.997 1.004+ 





Table 7.3b. continued 
        Significant Change (ref: HRS Cohort) 
  HRS Cohort  War Babies Early Boomers War Babies Early Boomers 
Spouse Agea 1.001 1.015 0.970 --- 
 Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: Good to Excellent)a 0.996** 0.931 0.619*** 
 
---- 
Spouse Employer Health Insurancea 0.842*** 0.652*** 0.399+ 
  Ref: Both Spouses Have Retiree Health Insurance 
     Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  1.069 0.541*** 1.336 
 
---- 
Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health Insurancea  0.520** 0.403* 0.572 
  Neither have Retiree Health Insurancea 0.648 0.298** 0.821 
  Either Missing Retiree Health Insurancea 0.533* 0.0823*** 0.495*** ---- 
 Spouse DB Pensiona 1.062 0.838 1.031 
  Spouse DC Pensiona 1.019 0.884*** 0.874 
  Spousal Contribution to Household Earningsa 1.003*** 0.992* 1.004*** 
  N  1065 350 427 
  Person Records 3555 1192 1420     
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; Coefficients are hazard ratios; +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001; 
Positive interactions: +p<.10, ++p<.05, +++p<.01,++++p<.001; Negative interactions: -p<.10,--p<.05,---p<.01,----p<.001 








Figure A7.1: Cumulative Hazard of Retirement (Self-Identification Definition) for 
Non-Couple Households: Men 
  
 
Figure A7.2: Cumulative Hazard of Retirement (Self-Identification Definition) for 
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Figure A7.3: Cumulative Hazard of Retirement (Social Security or Pension 




Figure A7.3: Cumulative Hazard of Retirement (Social Security or Pension 
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    Ref: HRS Cohort 
    War Babies 1.080 1.071 0.898 0.895 
Early Baby Boomers 0.923 0.899 0.513** 0.518** 
Age 1.211*** 1.206*** 1.210*** 1.207*** 
Ref: Non-Hispanic White     
Non-Hispanic Black 0.960 1.002 1.000 1.032 
Hispanic 0.910 0.904 0.984 0.985 
No. of living children 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.011 1.012 
Ref: BA+     
Less than high school 0.848 0.840 0.703*** 0.702*** 
High school or GED 0.982 0.983 0.825+ 0.832* 
Some college 0.998 1.012 0.760* 0.771+ 
Ref: Part-Time     
Full-Timea 0.639*** 0.639*** 0.744** 0.755* 
Other Work Statusa 1.557 1.550 2.103* 2.110* 
Job Stressfula 0.947*** 0.941*** 0.952 0.946 
Job Physically Demandinga 0.995 1.007 1.042+ 1.052 
Earnings in $10K unitsa 1.000 1.000 1.004** 1.004** 
Total years in labor forcea 1.004 1.004 1.017*** 1.015*** 
Employer Health Insurancea 0.806*** 0.803*** 0.897*** 0.901*** 
DB Pensiona 1.045 1.049 1.105 1.094 
DC Pensiona 0.625*** 0.626*** 0.762 0.753 
Probability of Work After 65a 0.986*** 0.986*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good to 
Excellent)a 
1.304*** 1.288*** 1.221* 1.229** 
Spousal and Couple Characteristics     
Wealth in $100K unitsa 1.013*** 1.014*** 0.993*** 0.993*** 
Spousal Retirement Statusa 1.136 1.154 1.290* 1.273* 
Spousal Probability of Work After 65a 0.997*** 0.997*** 0.999 0.999 
Spouse Agea 1.038* 1.040* 1.037*** 1.038*** 
Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: 
Good to Excellent)a 
1.031 1.054 1.314 1.334+ 
Spouse Employer Health Insurancea 1.147*** 1.127*** 1.213*** 1.223*** 
Ref: Both Spouses Have Retiree Health 
Insurancea 
    
Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health 
Insurancea  


























Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health 
Insurancea 
0.926*** 0.946*** 1.102*** 1.107** 
Neither have Retiree Health Insurancea 0.761*** 0.764*** 0.795*** 0.797*** 
Either Missing Retiree Health Insurancea 0.639*** 0.641*** 0.688* 0.698+ 
Spouse DB Pensiona 1.187*** 1.202*** 1.004 1.006 
Spouse DC Pensiona 0.910 0.914 1.008 1.005 
Spousal Contribution to Household 
Earningsa 
1.003 1.003 1.000 1.000 
N 1840 1703 1824 1698 
Person Records 5756 5531 5693 5480 
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; coefficients are hazard ratios; '+p<.10,*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001 
Note: Definition 1=self-identification; Definition 2=Social Security or Pension Collection 


















































    Ref: HRS Cohort 
War Babies 0.926 0.900 0.820 0.803 
Early Baby Boomers 0.954 0.943 0.934*** 0.946** 
Age 1.163*** 1.164*** 1.388*** 1.397*** 
Ref: Non-Hispanic White     
Non-Hispanic Black 0.890 0.927 0.970 0.971 
Hispanic 0.795 0.796 1.004 1.022 
No. of living children 1.002 1.004* 1.008 0.993 
Ref: BA+     
Less than high school 0.775 0.775 0.978 1.014 
High school or GED 0.851*** 0.859*** 0.901 0.901 
Some college 0.801** 0.818** 0.766*** 0.755*** 
Ref: Part-Timea     
Full-Timea 0.706+ 0.713+ 1.020* 1.064*** 
Other Work Statusa 1.314 1.334 1.931*** 1.990*** 
Job Stressfula 1.125 1.122 1.205+ 1.212+ 
Job Physically Demandinga 1.011 1.000 0.881*** 0.887*** 
Earnings in $10K unitsa 1.006 1.006 0.994 0.993 
Total years in labor forcea 1.009*** 1.009*** 1.015* 1.015*** 
Employer Health Insurancea 0.695** 0.696** 1.046*** 1.030+ 
DB Pensiona 1.158 1.147 1.593*** 1.594*** 
DC Pensiona 0.925 0.917 0.735*** 0.698*** 
Probability of Work After 65a 0.984*** 0.985*** 0.990*** 0.990*** 
Health Fair or Poor (Reference: Good 
to Excellent)a 
1.764*** 1.759*** 1.029 0.968 
Spousal and Couple Characteristics     
Wealth in $100K unitsa 1.015** 1.015** 1.010*** 1.010*** 
Spousal Retirement Statusa 1.641*** 1.620*** 1.547*** 1.579*** 
Spousal Probability of Work After 65a 0.996* 0.996* 1.000 1.000 
Spouse Agea 1.008 1.005 0.996 0.987 
Spouse Health Fair to Poor (Reference: 
Good to Excellent)a 
0.970 0.956 0.951+ 0.967 
Spouse Employer Health Insurancea 0.861 0.867 0.698*** 0.713*** 
Ref: Both Spouses Have Retiree Health 
Insurancea 
    
Only Wife’s Job has Retiree Health 
Insurancea  
0.962 0.976 0.960 0.943 
Only Husband’s Job has Retiree Health 
Insurancea  
0.740*** 0.736*** 0.534*** 0.527*** 



















Either Missing Retiree Health 
Insurancea 
0.736*** 0.753** 0.502*** 0.485*** 
Spouse DB Pensiona 1.118*** 1.128*** 1.006 0.974 
Spouse DC Pensiona 1.097 1.097 0.999 0.955 
Spousal Contribution to Household 
Earningsa 
1.002*** 1.002*** 1.003 1.002 
N 1847 1727 1842 1691 
Person Records 5902 5702 6167 5927 
Source: HRS; Author's calculations; coefficients are hazard ratios; '+p<.10,*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001 
Note: Definition 1=self-identification; Definition 2=Social Security or Pension Collection 










































































Figure 4.1: Probability of Working Full-Time After Age 65: Husbands 
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Figure 7.3: Cumulative Hazard of Retirement Using Pension or Social Security 
Collection Definition: Husbands 
  
 
Figure 7.4: Cumulative Hazard of Retirement Using Pension or Social Security 
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